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INTRODUGTION
Paula's a moneygrubber.' Anita's a manmuncher,2 driven by her
1 Paula Corbin Jones seeks $700,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from
President Clinton and Arkansas state trooper Danny Ferguson. ComplaintJones v. Fergu-
son, No. LR-C-94-290, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5739 (E.D. Ark. May 6, 1994) [hereinafter
Jones Complaint]. Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, alleges that Ferguson ar-
ranged for her to meet then-Governor Clinton in a hotel suite, where Clinton made unwel-
come sexual advances thatJones rebuffed. Id. at para. 6-27. Even members of her family
assert thatJones is motivated by greed. Howard Schneider, PaulaJones and a House Divided:
They Believe Sis. It's Her Motives They Don't Buy, WASH. Posr, June 9, 1994, at C1, C8.
The public similarly speculated that greed prompted Anita Hill to air her charges
against Clarence Thomas. Responding to a newspaper poll, one man noted that "[e]very
woman who's brought down a major man in the last five years has made millions of dol-
lars.... I look at what Anita Hill is saying, and I don't believe it." Joyce Price, Thomas W!
Not " Cy Unce," Eager Callers Sure Where Truth Rests, WASH. TxiMs, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al.
2 The term "manmuncher" comes from a recent bestselling novel. MICHAEL CRICH-
TON, DIscLOsuRE (1993). The novel's villainess, nicknamed "Meredith Manmuncher,"
compulsively uses her workplace power to seduce and bully her male subordinates. When
the protagonist refuses to submit to her advances, she accuses him of sexual harassment.
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hyperfeminist politics to smear men.8 Vindictive too-probably a
scorned woman.4 They're both at best a touch too sensitive; at worst,
outright liars.5 Or maybe even a little nuts.6 Kinda slutty, folks say.7
3 See DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL: THE UNTOLD STORY 340-48 (1993) (alleg-
ing that Hill has long been a "full-fledged campus radical" driven by extreme ideology on
gender and race issues). Brock also claims that Hill used charges of harassment and dis-
crimination to cover for her professional and personal shortcomings. Id. at 338-39.
4 In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, John Doggett II claimed
that Hill has "a problem with being rejected by men she was attracted to." Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 554 (1991) [hereinafter
Hearings]. Mr. Doggett testified at length that he felt Hill was attracted to him and that she
fantasized that he was interested in her. Id. at 554-59. He speculated that she may have
been similarly attracted to Clarence Thomas and entertained similar fantasies about
Thomas. Id. at 573. Virginia Lamp Thomas,Justice Thomas's wife, echoed this sentiment:
"In my heart, I always believed she was probably someone in love with my husband and
never got what she wanted." Virginia Lamp Thomas &Jane Sims Podesta, Breaking Silence:
Forced to Endure Her Husband's Trial by Fire, a Wife Speaks Out at Las PEOPLE, Nov. 11, 1991,
at 108, 111.
5 Michael Kinsley speculates that Jones may be a liar, and that even if her story is
true, it hardly amounts to sexual harassment, let alone intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Michael Kinsley, Pants on Fire, NEw REPUBUiC, May 30, 1994, at 6. In her lawsuit,
Jones seeks damages for defamation, citing in part veiled accusations from the Clinton
administration that she is lying. Jones Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 48-52, 75-77.
High-ranking government officials also branded Anita Hill a liar. Senator Arlen Spec-
ter accused her of "flat-out perjury." Hearings, supra note 4, at 230. Senator Orrin Hatch
engaged in an extended attack on Hill's story, insinuating that she concocted her accusa-
tions from stereotypes of black men, Peter William Blatty's 1971 novel THE ExoRc=sT, and a
Kansas sexual harassment case referring to pornographic film actor "Long Dong Silver."
Hearings, supra note 4, at 199-204. Professor Hill subsequently passed a lie detector test
administered by Paul Minor, the former head of the FBI's polygraph program. Michael
Isikoff, Hill's Story Said to Pass Polygraph Examination, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al, A22.
6 Echoing the conclusions of other wimesses at the hearings, Dean Charles Kothe
stated, "'I find the references to the alleged sexual harassment not only unbelievable but
preposterous. I'm convinced that such is a product of fantasy.'" Hearings, supra note 4, at
553 (quoting affidavit). John Doggett maintained, "I believe that Anita Hill believes what
she has said.... [But] the things she was saying in my mind were absolutely, totally beyond
the pale of reality." Id. at 573. For lay opinions that Professor Hill suffered from "Fatal
Attraction" syndrome, see Price, supra note 1, at Al. In debate on the Senate floor, Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond attempted to buttress these lay impressions with input from "ex-
perts": "I have been contacted by several psychiatrists, suggesting that it is entirely possible
that she is suffering from delusions. Perhaps she is living in a fantasy world." 137 CONG.
RFc. S14,649 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991).
Senator Thurmond apparently referred to erotomania, or De Clerambault's syn-
drome, an extremely rare disorder in which victims, mainly women, suffer from the delu-
sion that they are having an affair with someone of higher social status. AMEmUcAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOsrIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 297
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV]. Thomas supporters considered having experts testify
that Professor Hill may suffer from erotomania. JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE
JusrIO E 306-09 (1994). For the view that erotomania may be more a product of men's
wishful thinking than a true psychotic disorder, see Alessandra Stanley, Erotomania: A Rare
Disorder Runs Riot-in Men's Minds, N.Y. TIs, Nov. 10, 1991, § 4, at 2 (noting that Geraldo
Rivera, a self-proclaimed target of a woman with erotomania, could not find enough wo-
men with the disorder to devote an episode of his talk show to the topic).
7 David Brock portrays Professor Hill as sex-obsessed and foul-mouthed. BROCK,
supra note 3, at 357-58. He reports that Hill had "sexually taunted" one student, who de-
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And this is the worst thing: they're just two in a tide8 of devious,
deceived, or deranged women9 looking to haul men into the limelight
to answer frivolous or even false claims of sexual harassment. Con-
gress has decided to let these women go for men's wallets-the Civil
Rights Act of 199110 enables sex discrimination victims to seek com-
pensation for mental anguish and emotional distress without resorting
to tort actions."
So: What's a guy to do?
One answer: Sic a shrink on 'em.
Court-ordered mental examinations' 2 of sexual harassment plain-
scribed Hill as "the world's kinkiest law professor." Id. at 356. Other students alleged that
Hill put pubic hair in their papers. Id. at 355-56 (citing affidavit of student Lawrence
Shiles). Even conservative commentators have decried these largely unsubstantiated at-
tacks on Professor Hill's morality. See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Truth and Consequences, NAT'L
REv., July 5, 1993, at 47, 49 (book review) (declaring Brock's "psychoanalytic rampage" to
be "disgusting").
Similar innuendo surfaced about Paula Jones. Allegedly, she "wears tight skirts and
high heels" and has "been observed pinching men on the butt." Katherine Boo & Christo-
pher Georges, Tess of the D'Ozarks? Why the Likes of Paula Jones Should Get the Benefit of Our
Doubt, WASH. PosT, May 22, 1994, at C1.
8 Professor Hill's testimony is widely credited with prompting a significant increase
in the number of sexual harassment charges filed. According to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, sexual harassment claims in the year following the hearings in-
creased by nearly 50% over the prior year. Polly Basore Elliot, Sex Harassment Filings Keep
Rising, DALLAS MORNING Naws, Oct. 25, 1992, at 5H.
9 This Note refers to sexual harassment plaintiffs generically as women. Men have
also raised sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir.
1990); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Sers., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis.
1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit,
N.Y. TMEs, May 21, 1993, at A15 (reporting the verdict in Gutierrez v. California Acrylic
Indus., No. BC055641 (Cal. Super. Ct May 24, 1993), a suit brought by a male worker
against a female supervisor). Women, however, raise the overwhelming majority of sexual
harassment claims. See id. (citing EEOC statistics that men filed 968 of 10,577 sexual har-
assment claims in 1992 and 514 out of 6,886 claims in 1991).
10 Pub. L No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(Supp. V 1993)).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993); see also H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. 549, 602-03 (detailing rationale
for amendment of Title VII damages provisions). See generally discussion infra part I.B.4
(discussing provisions of and intent behind the 1991 Civil Rights Act).
12 When the mental or physical condition of a party is "in controversy" and the oppos-
ing party has "good cause" to explore that condition, a court may order an examination by
"a suitably licensed or certified examiner." FED. R. Crv. P. 35(a). The examination is gen-
erally conducted by a psychiatrist or a psychologist. The two fields are distinct in focus and
methodology, but overlap substantially. Defendants will often use experts from both fields
in tandem, employing a psychologist to administer personality tests that provide the basis
for a psychiatrises diagnosis and testimony. Wayne N. Outten & Jack A. Raisner, Cross-
Examining a Defense Psychologist in a Sexual Harassment Case, in SExuAL HARASSMENT LrrGA-
T1ON 1993, at 253, 265 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-463,
1993). Courts will thus often permit separate Rule 35 examinations by a psychologist and a
psychiatrist. See Ziemann v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 155 F.R.D. 497 (D.N.J.
1994) (noting differences between psychological and psychiatric analysis, and permitting
dual examinations of allegedly psychiatrically disabled sexual discrimination plaintiff). Ex-
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tiffs arguably present defendants and factfinders with a powerful tool
for ferreting out false or frivolous claims, or at least for rebutting
claims of compensable mental anguish.' 3 This tool, however, can be a
distressingly blunt weapon. Compelled mental examinations may best
serve defendants not by illuminating facts at issue in a case, but by
intimidating potential sexual harassment plaintiffs into silence.14 The
scope of such examinations can be dauntingly broad and invasive, per-
mitting inquiry into the plaintiffs entire psychological and sexual his-
tory.' 5 The specter of this invasive inquiry may discourage victims
from bringing valid claims. 16
More fundamental, routine use of compelled mental examina-
cept where explicitly stated, this Note does not distinguish between psychological and psy-
chiatric examinations.
13 See infra part IMiA. (discussing defendants' justifications for compelled mental
examinations).
14 Evidence indicates that some institutions use the threat of forced "fimess-for-duty"
mental evaluations to intimidate and retaliate against persons who claim sexual harassment
and discrimination. Margaret F.Jensvold, Workplace Sexual Harassment. The Use, Misuse, and
Abuse of Psychiatry, 23 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALs 438, 443 (1993) (citing anecdotal evidence
which suggests "that the practice is common and widespread"). Much caselaw and anecdo-
tal evidence supports this assertion. See, e.g., Patterson v. County of Fairfax, No. 94-1218,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 70, at *3 (4th Cir.Jan. 4, 1995) (discussing plaintiff's charge that she
was forced to undergo three psychological examinations after she had filed discrimination
and harassment charges against the EEOC); Mihalik v. Illinois Trade Ass'n, No. 93-C-6782,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2015, at *8 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 1994) (detailing plaintiff's charge that
she was ordered to submit to a psychiatric examination immediately after her supervisor
was subpoenaed to testify in a sexual harassment case which the plaintiff had brought
against a previous employer); Clinton Selects Admiral to Lead Forces in Pacific, N.Y. TiMEs,July
2, 1994, § 1, at 8 (stating that Navy lieutenant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evalua-
tion after filing sexual harassment complaint); Ruth Larson, FBIAgent Quits, Claims Reprisal
for Harassment Case, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at A10 (reporting FBI agent's claim that
she was subjected to psychological examinations after she charged a high-ranking agent
with sexual assault and harassment); Eric Schmitt, Harassed, Female and Navy, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 5, 1994, § 4, at 2 (stating that another Navy lieutenant was "forced to spend a three-
day weekend in a locked psychiatric unit" after she refused to drop a sexual harassment
complaint).
15 See, e.g., Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(granting defendant's request to have psychiatrist explore plaintiff's "entire life history,"
including marital history and social and private activities). See also infra part HIA. (discuss-
ing potential scope of mental examination).
16 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (stating that "reporting of sexual harassment claims would certainly be discouraged"
if courts endorsed "mental examinations in every Tide VII hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment case"); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that
allowing unchecked discovery of plaintiff's sexual history would discourage reporting of
valid claims). In a similar vein, members of Congress noted that the cruel scrutiny and
skepticism which greeted Anita Hill's claims are not atypical and may discourage victims
from seeking remedies. See 137 CoNG. REc. S14,649 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (testimony of
Sen. Leahy) (warning that Professor Hill's experience "is an object lesson for women about
the risk of speaking out"). Professor Hill has noted that procedural and evidentiary rules
that permit a sexual harassment victim's psychological history and past relationships to be
scrutinized create a chilling effect on potential plaintiffs. Thaai Walker, Anita Hill Tells of
Stress in Sexual Harassment Cases, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1993, at A7.
1272
1995] NO TE-CI RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 1273
tions is arguably a vestige of an outdated regime that focused undue
scrutiny on sexual misconduct victims. Until recently, commentators
urged that women alleging sexual abuse submit to a mental examina-
tion. 17 While modem courts have resoundingly rejected this posi-
tion,' 8 courts and legislatures have long embraced other procedural
and substantive hurdles that institutionalized distrust of women who
allege sexual misconduct 19 Like rape victims, sexual harassment
plaintiffs have typically faced unique legal obstacles that effectively
place their virtue and veracity on trial.20 Reform efforts, targeted at
17 See infra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing long-prevalent view that sex-
ual assault victims should submit to psychiatric evaluation given women's supposed ten-
dency to falsely or vindictively accuse men of rape).
18 See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
19 For example, American courts often incorporated into jury instructions Lord
Hale's warning that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent" 1 MAttrEw HAIL,
THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1778). See, e.g., People v. Benson, 6 Cal.
221, 223 (1856). This practice continued into the 1970s. See, e.g., People v. Rincon-Pineda,
538 P.2d 247, 252, 256 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (holding that the trial court failed to comply
with controlling precedent by refusing to give a cautionary instruction based on Hale's
warning, but that the instruction has "outworn its usefulness, and in modern circumstances
is no longer to be given mandatory application"). See generaly SusAN Esr-mcH, REAL RAPE
27-56 (discussing doctrinally-entrenched distrust of alleged rape victims).
20 These requirements include actual resistance, corroboration, and fresh complaint.
According to Professor Susan Estrich:
Rape is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it
is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives,
and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant.... We do
not require people to resist a mugger, even if the mugger was once a friend.
We do not insist on witnesses to robbery. We rarely question the virtue of
the robbed store clerk or even the defrauded company owner. We do not
downgrade larceny if the victim wore an expensive suit or walked on a dan-
gerous street, or even if he contributed to panhandlers in the past. Yet we
require rape victims to prove their virtue, and we impose obligations of
actual resistance, corroboration, and fresh complaint on them.
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 815 (1991). See also The Legal Bias Against
Rape Vritims, 61 A.BA. J. 464 (1975) (illustrating the double standard in rape law with a
hypothetical cross-examination of a robbery victim, insinuating that his expensive suit and
history of philanthropy were evidence that he asked to be robbed).
Much sexual harassment caselaw supports Professor Estrich's contention that " [ t hese
very same doctrines.. . are becoming familiar tools in sexual harassment cases." Estrich,
supra Several courts have refused to find actionable sexual harassment where plaintiffs
failed to object strenuously enough to vulgar behavior. See, e.g., Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff
Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Although Plaintiff rejected [her
supervisor's sexual advances], her initial rejections were neither unpleasant nor unambigu-
ous, and gave [him] no reason to believe that his moves were unwelcome."), affd, 913 F.2d
456 (7th Cir. 1990); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315,
1319 (D.NJ. 1983) (holding that plaintiff's participation in sexual banter precluded har-
assment claim despite indications in her diary that such banter was unwelcome); see also
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (stating that "the gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'" and that
evidence such as plaintiff's "provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies" is
"obviously relevant" to inquiry into whether advances were unwelcome). Other courts
have denied relief where harassment victims could not present first-hand corroboration.
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focusing inquiry on the behavior of the accused rather than the ac-
cuser,2' have eliminated many of these obstacles in rape actions. 22
Similarly, sexual harassment standards have increasingly steered
factfinders away from scrutinizing the behavior and mental state of
the accuser 23 and towards encouraging victims to act vigorously as
"private attorneys general" to eradicate sexual harassment.2 4
Unfettered use of adverse mental examinations is adverse to this
trend. Several factors inherent in mental health evaluations make
compelled psychiatric assessments attractive to harassers.2 5 Most nota-
bly, psychiatry and psychology tend "to focus on the individual's own
contribution to problems and on intra-individual vulnerabilities, as
opposed to what is being done to a person."26 Given this victim-cen-
tered focus, it is not surprising that some forensic clinicians maintain
that psychological peculiarities common in women who claim sexual
harassment and problems of proof inherent in sexual harassment ac-
See, e.g., Burns v. Terre Haute Regional Hosp., 581 F. Supp. 1301, 1308 (S.D. Ind. 1983)
(refusing to find actionable sexual harassment when plaintiff failed to present direct cor-
roboration of alleged misconduct, despite evidence that plaintiff described the incident to
her husband and co-workers). Finally, courts have rebuffed claims where victims fail to
immediately report harassment. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805
F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing plaintiffs failure to report alleged proposition for
three months as support for finding that plaintiff was not offended by the incident).
21 See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forcefid Conduct: A Propo-
sal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 399, 425-30 (1988) (proposing a
definition of rape which shifts the burdens of production and proof to the defendant);
Robin D. Wiener, Comment, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Stan-
dard in Rape, 6 HAtv. WOMEN'S U. 143, 146-49 (1983) (criticizing prevalent approaches to
consent, which place the burden of miscommunication on women).
22 The corroboration requirement has largely been eliminated because a rape vic-
tim's testimony is now generally believed to be as reliable as any other form of evidence.
See MIcH. COMP. Lws ANN. § 750.520(h) (West 1992); United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d
114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Re-
form, 81 YALE LJ. 1365 (1972) (arguing that corroboration requirement is unjustifiable).
In addition, courts now disfavor evidence of victims' past sexual behavior to show consent
to an alleged rape. See, e.g., Winfield v. Virginia, 301 S.E.2d 15, 19 (Va. 1983) (finding "no
logical connection between a woman's willingness to share intimacies with another man
with whom she might have had a special relationship" and her consent to intercourse with
the defendant). See generally Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again: A Legal Fallacy
in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAT. U. L. Rav. 127 (1976) (arguing that much evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior should be inadmissible). Reform efforts led to the enactment
of rape shield statutes-which sharply constrain defendants' ability to introduce evidence
of complainants' sexual history-in the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EVID. 412, and
in every state except Arizona, see Western Empire; DEav PosT, June 22, 1994, at B4 (report-
ing Utah's adoption of rape-shield rule, the forty-ninth state to do so). For a list and gen-
eral discussion of state rape shield statutes, see Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting
Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Viwtim's Sexual Histoy to Show the
Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. REv. 541, 555-57 (1991).
23 See infra part I.B.3 (discussing abolition of the requirement that plaintiffs demon-
strate actual psychological injury to state a valid Title VII claim).
24 H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 11, at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 603.
25 Jensvold, supra note 14, at 442.
26 Id.
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tions necessitate extensive mental examinations of nearly every sexual
harassment plaintiff.27 Such arguments echo those once used to sup-
port the now discredited contention that nearly all rape victims
should undergo mental examinations.28 Uncritical acceptance of this
position by contemporary courts would subvert the trend toward sex-
ual harassment law reform by focusing undue scrutiny on the virtue
and veracity of victims rather than on the behavior of their harassers.
As the number of sexual harassment victims seeking compensa-
tory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 climbs, 29 courts will
face increasing attempts to compel these plaintiffs to submit to mental
examinations. Thus far, courts have reached no consensus as to
whether, or under what circumstances, such plaintiffs may be com-
pelled to submit to an examination.30 Recent commentary, drawing
upon the treatment of motions to compel examinations in common-
law actions for mental injuries, suggests that the answer is simple: by
seeking damages for emotional distress, the sexual harassment plain-
tiff exposes herself to an adverse examination.3'
27 See infra parts HIA, MI.B.3.
28 See infra note 163.
29 Actions seeking damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are only beginning to
percolate through the courts. The Supreme Court recently held that the damages provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively. Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 114 S. Ct 1483, 1508 (1994). Thus, sexual harassment plaintiffs may only seek
compensation under the 1991 Act for conduct occurring since November 21, 1991. Id. at
1506.
80 Compare Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 158 F.R.D. 409 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (grant-
ing examination) with Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(denying examination). The Jansen court limited its holding in two key respects. First, it
stressed that plaintiff's claim of continuing, rather than past, emotional suffering warranted
an examination. 158 F.R.D. at 410. See also Curtis v. Express, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 467
(N.D.N.Y. 1994) (disallowing mental examination of racial discrimination plaintiff seeking
damages for past emotional distress under Title VII and New York human rights law);
Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 222 (suggesting that claim of ongoing mental injury may provide
sufficient basis for compelled examination); infra note 143 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, expressing skepticism that the defendant should be allowed to designate the examin-
ing expert, the Jansen court ordered the parties to reach consensus on an "independent"
examiner. 158 F.R.D. at 411. In so holding, the court recognized "that mental examina-
tions are particularly sensitive (usually more so than physical examinations), both because
of the very different (and lesser) degree of objectivity that they are typically able to provide
and because of the special dangers of intrusiveness that they present." Id. at 410. The
Bridges court refused to compel mental examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs who
sought mental anguish damages under New York human rights law, see N.Y. ExEc. LAw
§ 297(4) (c) (iii) (McKinney 1993). While the court held that the plaintiffs' claims for com-
pensatory damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act were invalid because the Act is non-
retroactive, 850 F. Supp. at 219, its analysis of the issue of compelled mental examinations
focuses on distinctions between antidiscrimination actions and tort actions. Id. at 222.
The Bridges court's reasoning would thus readily apply to actions for emotional distress
damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
31 See Outten & Raisner, supra note 12, at 265 ("EV]irtually every court will order a
requested mental examination when [compensatory damages for emotional distress under
the 1991 Act] are sought."); Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a SexualHarassment Case After the
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This Note proposes that this issue is not so easily resolved and
urges that courts considering such motions carefully balance the ben-
efits and costs of granting them. In many circumstances, this balance
will favor denial of the motion. Because a court must ground its in-
quiry in the rapidly evolving concerns behind and standards em-
ployed in sexual harassment cases, Part I of this Note examines the
evolution of sexual harassment law. This Part notes that the law has
gone from affording virtually no recognition of sexual harassment to
acknowledging it as a pervasive social problem and providing an in-
creasingly comprehensive remedial scheme for victims. In the pro-
cess, courts have stripped away legal standards and practices that
devalued women's perspectives and discouraged them from bringing
suit. Part II explores the historical treatment of motions to compel
mental examinations, both generally and in sexual harassment cases.
This Part notes that courts have found many circumstances in which
compelled mental examinations are inappropriate and have ex-
pressed heightened concern about such examinations in sexual mis-
conduct cases.
Part III discusses factors that courts facing motions to compel ex-
aminations should consider as they balance the interests of the parties
involved. This Part argues that, in most cases, the privacy interests of
plaintiffs, the social interests embodied in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
and the general tide of sexual harassment legal reform outweigh the
probative value of mental examinations to the defendant and the
factfinder. Part IV proposes ancillary reform measures designed to
prevent abuse of compelled examinations while preserving defend-
ants' rights to respond to charges of sexual harassment.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CAUSE OF
ACTION
"Sexual harassment is a problem with a long past but a short histoy."32
Sexual harassment has been pervasive33 ever since women en-
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 68 NotRE D~mE L. REv. 1037, 1051-52 (1993) (suggesting that any
mental anguish claim places the victim's emotional condition in controversy and thus war-
rants a mental examination, and that plaintiffs may need to use expert testimony to sub-
stantiate emotional distress claims in virtually every case).
32 Louise F. Fitzgerald & Sandra L. Shullman, Sexual Harassment: A Research Analysis
and Agenda for the 1990s, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAv. 5, 23 (1993).
33 Surveys have consistently shown that large numbers of women suffer workplace
sexual harassment. Federal government surveys conducted in 1987 and 1980 both found
that over 40% of women respondents had been subjected to some form of sexual harass-
ment. UNrrED STATES MERIT SYsrEMs PROTEcrION BoARD, SEXuAL HARASSMENT IN THE FED
ERAL GovERNmENT AN UPDATE 3 (1988); UNrrED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BoARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDmiAL WORKPLAcE: IS IT A PRoBLEM? 2 (1981).
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tered the workforce.3 4 It was not, however, widely recognized as a so-
cial and legal problem until the mid-1970s.3 5 Since then, sexual
harassment has undergone a fitful and controversial evolution as a
legal cause of action. This Part will briefly sketch that evolution. It
will first examine the traditional common-law treatment of sexual har-
assment, then trace the development of sexual harassment as sex dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 This Part
will focus particularly on the continuing evolution of the "hostile work
environment" claim under Title VII and note that standards for prov-
ing such a claim have become more hospitable to plaintiffs, thereby
advancing Title VII's goal of eradicating workplace discrimination. Fi-
nally, this Part will outline the provisions of and intent behind the
1991 Civil Rights Act.
Other recent studies have found that 40-60% of women say that they have been harassed at
some point during their careers. Kara Swisher, Laying Down the Law on Harassment; Court
Rulings SpurFirms to Take Preventive Track, WASH. Posr, Feb. 6, 1994, at H1, H5. See generally
Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 335, 343-45 (1992) (summarizing studies of the frequency of sexual harassment
and concluding that one-half to one-third of all working women have been harassed). In-
formal surveys have reported that sexual harassment occurs with even greater frequency.
See, e.g. Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217 (reporting that nearly 90% of respondents to readers'
poll stated they had received unwanted attention at work, ranging from "leering and
ogling" to overt requests for sexual favors); Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment. The Inside
Story, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 47-51 (reporting that over 60% of nearly 10,000
readers surveyed had been harassed).
34 Documented accounts of workplace sexual harassment of women predate the in-
dustrial revolution. For historical accounts, see IAN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHA EDOWN: THE SEX-
uAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 28-44 (1978); KERRY SEGRAvE, THE SEXuAL
HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 TO 1993 passim (1994).
35 The term "sexual harassment" did not surface in legal and social usage until 1975.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX Dis-
CRIMI ATION 27 n.13 (1979). Initial awareness of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment
was largely spurred by surveys and articles published in the popular media. See, e.g., Safran,
supra note 33.
Professor Barbara Gutek observes that the sudden "discovery" of sexual harassment
was counterintuitive, as it defied the prevailing notion that "women were believed to bene-
fit from... sexual behaviors at work, gaining unfair advantage and acquiring perks and
privileges from their flirtatious and seductive behavior." Cutek, supra note 33, at 336. She
further notes that popular entertainment continues to portray women who use their sexu-
ality to attain work-related goals. Id. at 336 n.2. Characteristically, the only successful fic-
tional treatments of sexual harassment-Michael Crichton's novel Disclosure, see CRICHTON,
supra note 2, and the 1994 Warner Brothers film based on the novel-feature a woman
who attempts to seduce a male underling and then seeks to eliminate him from the work-
place by bringing a false harassment claim.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). While sexual harassment plaintiffs most frequently
invoke Title VII and the common law, other schemes can provide redress for harassment
victims. Among the alternatives invoked are state fair employment and housing statutes,
federal civil rights statutes, unemployment compensation statutes, worker's compensation
statutes, contract law, collective bargaining agreements, civil RICO, and criminal law. BAR-
BARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 291-414
(1992).
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A. Sexual Harassment Under Tort Law
In theory, tort law should provide redress to sexual harassment
victims: they are, after all, victims of intentionally or negligently in-
flicted harm, and they frequently suffer loss of job status as well as
psychic and physical harm.37 In practice, until courts recognized sex-
ual harassment as actionable sex discrimination, common-law reme-
dies provided the only redress available to victims. Sexual harassment,
however, does not fit neatly into traditional tort theories.3 8 Thus,
while plaintiffs have continued to use tort claims for compensatory
and punitive damages to supplement the limited remedies available
under Title VII, 39 the common law has failed to provide a coherent
scheme that enables victims to combat workplace sexual harassment.40
Well before the phrase "sexual harassment" entered the lexicon,
women were awarded damages for sexual invasions in actions based
on assault and battery.4 1 These torts have afforded redress for some
modem workplace harassment victims as well,42 particularly in cases of
outright sexual molestation.43 Application of these torts to workplace
37 See Gutek, supra note 33, at 348-50 (surveying studies of the negative consequences
of sexual harassment for women workers, which range from decreased job performance to
physical and emotional illness).
38 See MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 161 ("Although the facts of sexual discrimination
have a long history in women's suffering, the prohibition on sex discrimination as such
lacks a common law history."); see also Terry M. Dworkin et al., Theories of Recovey for Sexual
Harassment: Going Beyond Title VI, 25 SAN DIEGO L Rav. 125 (1988) (arguing that the
nature of sexual harassment claims tends to diminish the possibility of recovery in tort).
39 See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir.
1983) (accepting jurisdiction of state law claims pendant to plaintiff's Title VII claim).
40 In response to the incomplete remedies provided by Title VII and the inadequacy
and rigidity of state tort law, one commentator has proposed the implementation of a
specific tort claim for sexual harassment. See KristaJ. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of
Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 184 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986). Another
has proposed recognition of such a tort because sexual harassment does not fit the para-
digm of sex discrimination. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination:
A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y RaV. 333, 362-63 (1990).
41 Early sexual invasion cases finding assault and/or battery include: Hatchett v.
Blacketer, 172 S.W. 533, 534 (Ky. 1915) (upholding an award of $10,000 against a man who
unlawfully detained a woman and squeezed her breast); Ragsdale v. Ezell, 49 S.W. 775, 776
(Ky. 1899) (finding assault and battery when a man squeezed the breast of a woman and
touched her face); Martin v. Jansen, 193 P. 674 (Wash. 1920) (awarding damages to a
woman who claimed the defendant lewdly and lasciviously fondled her without consent).
Catherine MacKinnon notes that these courts' willingness to provide civil redress for sexual
invasions stemmed from the era's relative willingness to equate women's virtue with their
value. MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 164.
42 See, e.g., Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)
(assessing compensatory and punitive damages award against a supervisor who repeatedly
fondled an employee); Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305
(D.D.C 1980) (awarding $52,000 for offensive and explicitly sexual touching).
43 See, e.g., Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(awarding punitive damages for attempted rape); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 F. Supp. 1043
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (awarding damages to a woman who had been drugged and raped by her
employer), affd, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987).
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harassment, however, is obviously limited: assault and battery require
threatened or actual physical contact.44 They do not, therefore, af-
ford relief for verbal harassment, no matter how pervasive or severe
the abuse.45
Victims of verbal harassment can succeed in suits alleging inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.46 Plaintiffs alleging the tort
must demonstrate that the defendant acted outrageously, and in so
doing intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress
upon the plaintiff.47 Theoretically, a defendant's creation of a sexu-
ally hostile work environments should per se satisfy the elements of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.49 A hostile work environ-
ment is essentially one that a reasonable person would consider abu-
sive-hence, one that contemporary social standards would deem
outrageous. 50 Furthermore, tort law has embraced the principle that
employment status entitles a person to heightened protection from
insult and outrage at her workplace. 51
44 Assault and battery are separate actions, though plaintiff often bring them in tan-
dem. Assault occurs when a person "acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a
contact and.., the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 21 (1965). Battery requires unwelcome intentional contact that is
harmful or offensive. See id. § 18.
45 See id. § 31 cmt. a (noting that "mere words do not constitute an assault").
46 See, e.g., Coleman v. American Broadcasting Co., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 65,
70 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds that
"sexual advances, verbal comments, [and] sexual solicitations" may "rise to a level support-
ing intentional infliction of emotional distress").
47 RESTATE NT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
48 See infra part I.B.2. (discussing hostile environment cause of action).
49 1 ALBA CoNTE, SExuAL HARASSMENT iN ThE WOoiLACE: L~w Arm PRAcnCE 407 (2d
ed. 1994). Some courts have accepted this view. See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Penninsula
Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[B]y its very nature, [hostile environ-
ment] sexual harassment in the work place is outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds
of decency usually tolerated by a decent society."); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986
(D.C. 1984) (rejecting the view that "degrading and humiliating" harassment amounted at
worst to a "social impropriety" rather than an outrage).
50 See Retherford v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992)
("[O]ur society has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the work place as a playful inevita-
bility that should be taken in good spirits .... [T]he conduct generally labeled sexual
harassment is outrageous and intolerable and... satisfies the elements of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress."); Fisher, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 858; Benson A. Wolman,
Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U. L.
RFv. 245 (1988) (arguing that social standards of outrageousness have evolved towards
protection of harassment victims and will continue to do so).
51 1 Co-NT, supra note 49, at 407. Outrageousness is often determined by the social
context of the act:
[T]he work culture in some situations may contemplate a degree of teasing
and taunting that in other circumstances might be considered cruel and
outrageous. But though the social context may make some questionable
conduct tolerable, the same social context may make other acts especially
outrageous. Sexual harassment on the job is undoubtedly an intentional
infliction of emotional distress, for example, and harassment is probably
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1268
In practice, however, the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress has proven a haphazard mechanism through which to
combat sexual harassment. First, state standards for proving the tort
vary: some states bar claims of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in the absence of demonstrable physical harm.52 Second,
worker's compensation statutes bar many claims for employment-re-
lated torts.53 Finally, notions persist that sexually charged behavior is
too much a part of the fabric of working life to be considered "outra-
geous."54 Consequently, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress has not offered a consistent scheme for compensating sexual
harassment victims.
Even if sexual harassment fit more comfortably into traditional
tort theory, the common law would still not fully address the issue of
more readily found in the acts of a supervisor than in the acts of acquaint-
ances at a dinner party.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 18 (5th ed. Supp.
1988) (citations omitted).
In addition, tort law should be particularly responsive to persons in positions of au-
thority in the workplace who use their power to intimidate and harass: "The extreme and
outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or
a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965).
52 See, e.g., Polk v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 801 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1986) (Michigan
law); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aftd, 856 F.2d 184
(3d Cir. 1988); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1986).
53 State workers' compensation systems generally provide the exclusive state-law rem-
edy for workplace injuries. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1993) (presenting typical
exclusivity provision). Courts have held that exclusivity provisions can bar claims by sexual
harassment victims of assault and battery, e.g., Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d
1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986); Parker v. Tharp, 409 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Baker v. Wendy's of Mont., Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984), and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, e.g., Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp., 634 F. Supp. 684 (D. Haw.
1986); Miller v. Lindenwood Female College, 616 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
Other states, however, have held that tort claims arising from sexual harassment are
not barred by workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc.,
549 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding that emotional trauma caused by sexual
harassment is not an employment-related risk, and thus action was not barred by exclusivity
provision); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 587 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that harassing acts
were intentional, not accidental, and thus outside the scope of workers' compensation
exclusion). See generallyJane ByeffKorn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Har-
assment, 67 TUL L. REv. 1363, 1378-1417 (1993) (discussing the split among states regard-
ing exclusion of sexual harassment tort claims and arguing against exclusion).
54 SeeAndrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486-87 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that, "as a general rule" under Pennsylvania law, a claim of sexual harassment alone does
not rise to the level of outrageousness required for recovery); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that suggestive remarks and non-vulgar touching
are insufficiently outrageous under Virginia law); Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806
F.2d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding dirtyjokes and profane suggestions insufficiently
outrageous under Florida law); see also Peter G. Nash &Jonathan R. Mook, Employee Tort
Actions for Sexual Harassment in Virginia: Negotiating the Liability Mine Field, 1 GEO. MASON
U. Crv. RTS. LJ. 247, 250 (1990) (stating that "it will be the rare employment situation
where [shocking and outrageous] verbal abuse can meet the stringent requisite[s]" of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action).
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sexual harassment. Workplace sexual harassment is a pervasive social
ailment as well as a personal problem for victims. 55 Should the law
view sexual harassment only as a tort-a personal cause of action-it
would ignore this social dimension 56 and fail to recognize that sexual
harassment is inextricably bound with other elements of gender dis-
crimination that hinder women's employment opportunities.57 Led
by Catherine MacKinnon, feminist scholars thus urged recognition of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under
federal civil rights law.58
B. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex-based dis-
crimination in employment.59 It does not, however, mention sexual
55 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56 Professor MacKinnon notes:
The... suggestions that sexual harassment be treated as a tort-a private
harm-applies, unstated, the view that the interest to be protected is not so
much an interest of women as a sex in employment opportunities as it is a
personal interest. ... To the extent that tort theory fails to capture the
broadly social sexuality/employment nexus that comprises the injury of sex-
ual harassment, by treating the incidents as if they are outrages particular to
an individual woman rather than integral to her social status as a woman
worker, the personal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the rele-
vant dimensions of the problem.
MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 88.
57 Disparity in wages is another such problem. While the earnings gap has consist-
ently eroded for over a decade, in 1992 women earned 75.4% of what men earned. THE
AMERICAN WOMAN 1994-95 308-09 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. Stone eds., 1994) (citing
BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS Table 56
(1993)). In addition, women remain concentrated in "traditional" occupations. See
FRANCINE D. BEAu & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK
155-61 (1986).
58 See, e.g., MAcKINNON, supra note 35, passim. Professor Cass Sunstein notes that Pro-
fessor MacKinnon had a dramatic impact on the subsequent recognition of sexual harass-
ment as actionable sex discrimination, though the view seemed "bizarre and radical" when
initially advanced. Cass Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theoy, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826, 829
(1988) (reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)). For a thor-
ough summary of Se-ual Harassment of Working Women and an assessment of its impact, see
Holly B. Fechner, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harassment Law and
the Reconstruction ofFats, 23 U. Mca .J.L. REF. 475, 480-87 (1990). For a general account of
sexual harassment scholarship and its impact on legal reform, see Martha Chamallas, Es-
say, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 37
(1993).
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(a) (1988) states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" (emphasis
added).
It is essentially an accident that Tile VII addresses sex-based discrimination at all. The
amendment adding the word "sex" was advanced by Southern congressmen opposed to the
Act in an eleventh-hour attempt to defeat its passage. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Smith and others); Francis J. Vaas, Title VIU Legislative Histor, 7 B.C.
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harassment. Early attempts by sexual harassment victims to assert a
cause of action under Title VII failed; deprived of statutory guidance
as to what constitutes sex-based discrimination, 60 federal courts ini-
tially held that sexual harassment was not discrimination based on
gender.61 These courts instead characterized harassment as interper-
sonal conflicts stemming from characteristics peculiar to the individ-
ual involved.62 In 1976, however, a district court ruled in Williams v.
Saxbe63 that sexual harassment is sex-based discrimination which vio-
lates Title VII. Circuit courts tentatively followed suit.64
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
These early suits established a cause of action for quid pro quo
harassment, in which an employee's response to "unwelcome sexual
advances [or] requests for sexual favors"65 results in a grant or denial
of tangible job benefits.66 Quid pro quo causes of action arise only
under narrowly-defined factual circumstances. 67 A plaintiff must
INDus. & COM. L. Ray. 431, 441 (1966) (stating that Representative Smith, who was "not a
civil rights enthusiast," offered the amendment "in a spirit of satire").
60 Cf Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (stating that the last
minute addition of sex-based discrimination to Title VII left the Court with "little legislative
history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on
'sex-"). No hearings were held on the amendment and it was approved after sharply con-
stricted debate. Vaas, supra note 59, at 442.
61 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.NJ.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v.
Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v.
Costie, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
62 See, e.g., Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163 (holding that a supervisor's sexually inappropri-
ate conduct was "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism");
Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 12-24 (stating that allegedly harassing conduct
amounted to "subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship" and thus did "not evi-
dence an arbitrary barrier to continued employment based on plaintiff's sex"). See also
Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Askfor lt: The "Unwelcome"Requirement in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 77 CORNELL L. Ra-. 1558, 1563 (1992) (summarizing these courts' reasoning: "Jane
Doe was harassed because she was Jane Doe, not because she was a woman."). Some of
these courts suggested that, since the harassment amounted to interpersonal wrongdoing,
tort law would provide appropriate remedies. See, e.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Barnes,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 124.
65 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
64 E.g. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d
1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
65 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
66 Tangible benefits include continued employment, transfers, promotions, favorable
evaluations, and pay raises. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49.
67 See Estrich, supra note 20, at 834 (arguing that requirements of the quid pro quo
cause of action might make "all but the most perfect plaintiffs unable to establish the
requisite nexus, and all but the most perfectly stupid defendants able to rebut successfully
a prima facie case").
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prove, in essence, that someone with authority to change her job sta-
tus 68 told her to "sleep with me or I'll fire you," and that the denial or
receipt of job benefits hinged on her response. 69 Indeed, the first
successful sexual harassment suits under Title VII were brought by wo-
men who had been fired for refusing sexual advances from
supervisors. 70
2. Hostile Environment Harassment
While courts' acknowledgement of quid pro quo harassment
marked a significant development, this cause of action failed to ad-
dress a more pervasive and elusive form of harassment: sexually-
charged abuse that pervades the work environment but does not di-
rectly lead to the loss of tangible job benefits.7 ' In the 1980s, how-
ever, courts expanded the definition of sexual harassment to
encompass claims alleging an abusive work environment which did
not directly deprive the victim of tangible job benefits.
Spurred by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
1980 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex (EEOC Guide-
lines),72 courts began to find Title VII violations where employers cre-
68 See, e.g., 1 CorrE, supra note 49, at 22. In contrast, employers, supervisors, cowork-
ers, customers, or clients can create a hostile work environment. Id.
69 The defendant may respond by asserting that no unwelcome sexual advance oc-
curred, or that, even if such an advance did occur, any adverse employment decision
stemmed from nondiscriminatory motives. Li EItmAN & KADUE, supra note 36, at 130.
70 See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (finding that plaintiff was "asked to bow to [supervisor's
sexual demands] as the price for holding her job"); Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 656 (finding
that the plaintiff was harassed and ultimately fired for refusing supervisor's sexual
advances).
71 Such abuse generally falls into one of three categories: (1) sexual advances which
do not amount to quid pro quo harassment, see supra part I.B.1; (2) gender-based animos-
ity, in which a female employee, often in a traditionally male occupation, is abused by
males who resent her presence; or (3) a sexually charged workplace, such as one which
features open displays of pornography or unremitting sexual misbehavior. BARBARA LaNDE-
MANN & DAVID D. KADUE, PRIMER ON SExuAl. HARASSMENT 15 (1992).
72 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995). The 1980 Guidelines broadened the definition of sex-
ual harassment that violates Title VII to include "conduct [that] has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment." The Guidelines prompted a massive
increase in Title VII sexual harassment litigation. In 1980, the EEOC reported that com-
plainants filed 75 sexual harassment claims; in 1981, that figurejumped to 3,812. 1 CoNTE,
supra note 49, at 33.
The 1980 Guidelines, formulated during the Carter Administration, received heavy
criticism from President-elect Ronald Reagan's transition team. The group's report, co-
authored by transition team member and future EEOC chair Clarence Thomas, concluded
that "[t]he elimination of personal slights and sexual advances which contribute to an
'intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment' is a goal impossible to reach. Ex-
penditures of the EEOC's limited resources in pursuit of this goal is unwise." See Paul
Taylor, Thomas's View of Harassment Said to Evolve WAsH. Posr, October 11, 1991, at A10.
The Reagan Administration's fears about expanding definitions of sexual harassment
prompted it to urge the Supreme Court to limit availability of the hostile environment
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ated or condoned sexually hostile work environments.73 In 1982, the
Eleventh Circuit clarified the elements of a prima facie hostile envi-
ronment case in Henson v. City ofDundee:74 (1) the employee belongs
to a protected group,75 (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment, 76 (3) the harassment complained of was based on
gender, 77 (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege
cause of action. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) (asserting that distinctions between sexual har-
assment and "natural" sexual attraction in the workplace are inherently difficult to ascer-
tain and urging that the Court not extend vicarious liability to hostile environment
actions).
73 In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44, 945 n.10, 948 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared itself the first federal appellate
court to explicitly adopt the 1980 Guideline's sexually hostile work environment provi-
sions. The court noted that hostile environment claims were not novel: courts had previ-
ously found racially hostile work environments to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.) (holding that
segregated eating clubs condoned by employer created a discriminatory work environ-
ment), cert. denieA 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)
(finding that employer's practice of segregating optometry patients created a hostile work
environment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
74 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982). Some circuits have slightly reformulated the ele-
ments of a prima facie hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc.,
830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring (1) unwelcome conduct amounting to (2)
harassment based on sex which is (3) "sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive
working environment," and (4) some basis for imputing liability to the employer); Carrero
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring (1) unwelcome
conduct that is (2) prompted by gender and (3) sufficiently pervasive to create an environ-
ment antithetical to "priority of merit").
75 In sex discrimination cases, only a stipulation that the employee is a man or a
woman is required. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
76 Id. Courts have generally held that harassing behavior need not be explicitly sexual
to qualify as sex discrimination so long as it amounts to unequal treatment based on gen-
der. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that male workers' verbal attacks, while not explicitly sexual, were charged with "anti-
female animus" and thus contributed to a hostile environment); McKinney v. Dole, 765
F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that conduct which would not occur but for the
sex of the harassed employee is actionable sexual harassment, even if the conduct does not
consist of sexual advances or other overtly sexual conduct).
The EEOC's Guidelines were initially misleading with respect to whether conduct
must be of a "sexual nature" to be actionable. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (stating that
sexual harassment consists of "sexual advances... and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature"). Some courts were confused by this language. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Atlan-
tic City Convention Ctr. Auth., 53 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1867-68 (D.NJ. 1990)
(holding that male co-workers' refusal to work with complainant was not sexual harass-
ment because it was not "conduct of a sexual nature"). The EEOC has since made it clear
that proof of sexual activity or language is not necessary to prove unlawful sexual harass-
ment; the harassment need only be "sufficiently patterned or pervasive" and directed at
employees because of their gender. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 405:6692 (March 19, 1990).
77 The court noted that this element is generally a "simple matter" because "[i]n the
typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female worker, it is
obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar fashion." Henson, 682
F.2d at 904. However, where "a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes
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of employment, and (5) the employer is liable under respondeat supe-
rior.78 The court established that psychological well-being is a term,
condition, or privilege of employment 7 9 In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,80 the Supreme Court acknowledged that "Title VII is not lim-
ited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination"81 and that "a plaintiff
may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive working environment."8 2
3. A Matter of Perspective: The Evolution of the Standard for
Proving a Hostile Work Environment
The Meritor Court attempted to establish a standard for proving
that a work environment is hostile: "For sexual harassment to be ac-
tionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.'"83 The Court asserted that "[t] he gravamen of any sex-
ual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come.'"84 Drawing from the EEOC Guidelines, the Court held that
or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female workers," Title
VII does not apply. Id.
Presumably, then, Title VII provides no cause of action for bisexual harassment. Cf
Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.) (affirmingjudgment against plain-
tiffs on the ground that "abusive" supervisor's "temper was manifested indiscriminately to-
ward men and women"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988). A few courts and commentators
have considered this an indication that Congress did not intend for sexual harassment to
fall under Title VII's definition of sex discrimination. SeeVinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330,
1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (doubting that
Congress intended Title VII to prohibit any form of sexual harassment because it does not
prohibit bisexual harassment), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(stating that unwanted sexual advances must be outside Title VI's contemplation because
bisexual advances would not provide basis for suit), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d
55 (9th Cir. 1977); Paul, supra note 40, at 351.
78 Where the plaintiff attempts "to hold [an] employer responsible for the hostile
environment created by the plaintiff's supervisor or co-worker, she must show that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action." Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (footnote omitted). The employee may
prove such knowledge by showing that she complained to higher management, or by show-
ing that the harassment is pervasive. Id.
79 Henson, 682 F.2d at 897.
80 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
81 Id. at 64.
82 Id. at 66.
83 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
84 Id. at 68. The Court thus overruled the trial court's holding that Ms. Vinson did
not state a claim because her relationship with her supervisor was voluntary. See Vinson v.
Taylor, 23 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980). Justice Rehnquist stated that
"the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary' in the sense that the complainant was not
forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit." 477 U.S.
at 68.
Unfortunately, the Court's specific holding on the unwelcomeness issue invites courts
to focus on the behavior of the victim as perceived by the harasser. The Court held that
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the existence of sexual harassment must be determined "in light of
the 'record as a whole' and 'the totality of circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred."' 85
In response to Meritor, the circuit courts adopted semantically
similar tests for evaluating the "totality of the circumstances" to deter-
mine whether a work environment was sufficiently hostile to violate
Title VII. All the standards focused on the objective perception of a
"reasonable" individual: Would a reasonable person find the work en-
vironment hostile, based on some analysis of the totality of circum-
stances? Thus, the courts firmly established that Title VII is not "a
vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensi-
tive."8 6 In applying and refining their standards, however, the circuits
presented divergent views as to how hostile a defendant's actions or
how severe a plaintiff's injury must be to trigger Title VII remedies.
a. Split Circuits: The Unreasonableness + Actual Injury Test v.
the Purely Objective Standard
In Rabidue v. Oscoela Refining Co.,87 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit applied a strict objective/subjective test for evaluating an
allegedly hostile work environment. Under this dual standard, the
plaintiff must show (1) that the harasser's conduct was objectively un-
reasonable and would "affect seriously the psychological well-being of
[a] reasonable person under like circumstances"8 and (2) that the
plaintiff actually "suffered some degree" of psychological injury.8 9
Other circuits adopted forms of the Rabidue test, requiring that plain-
tiffs show psychological injury in addition to satisfying an objective
standard.90
testimony about Ms. Vinson's provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies,
deemed immaterial by the court of appeals, see Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), was relevant as to whether she found her supervisor's advances unwelcome.
477 U.S. at 69. The holding injects "outmoded stereotypes" into hostile work environment
analysis, adopting a harasser's perspective of welcomeness: a woman who might be seen to
behave as if she "wants it" has no grounds to object to any specific attention which her
behavior provokes, regardless of whether she actually welcomes that conduct. Juliano,
supra note 62, at 1573-74. Thus, while Meritor marks a significant advance in sexual harass-
ment law, the Court's holding also engrafts sex-based discrimination into a process created
to eradicate discrimination. Cf. Estrich, supra note 20, at 825 ("The Court's holding marks
the conclusion of the first part of our story, the birth of a federal cause of action, and the
introduction to the second, the dominance of sexism in defining that cause of action.").
85 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
86 Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
87 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
88 Id. at 620.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1989); Sparks v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Scott v. Sears,
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The EEOC, however, specifically repudiated the Rabidue ap-
proach, stating in a 1990 policy guide that a plaintiff need not show
psychological injury to state a valid hostile environment claim.91 In
Ellison v. Brady,92 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted
the EEOC's approach and rejected the actual injury requirement.
The court stated that proper inquiry in hostile environment claims
focuses on the harasser's conduct rather than the victim's mental for-
titude, and that "Title VII's protection of employees from sex discrimi-
nation comes into play long before the point where victims of sexual
harassment require psychiatric assistance."93 The EEOC subsequently
expressed strong approval of the Ninth Circuit's position, stating that
the actual injury requirement "misdirects the inquiry in a way that un-
dermines Title VII's prohibitions on discrimination in employment."94
Other circuit courts, without specifically addressing the propriety of
the actual injury requirement, adopted standards that did not require
plaintiffs to demonstrate actual mental injury in order to state a valid
hostile environment claim.95
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying recovery to plaintiff who did
not show that she was psychologically debilitated by sexual harassment). Cf Paroline v.
Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that
harassment either "significantly affected her psychological well-being" or "interfered with
her ability to perform her work"), vacated in part 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
91 EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 76, at 405:6690 n.20. See
also Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae at 14-22, Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168) [here-
inafter EEOC Brief] (detailing the EEOG's opposition to the "actual injury" prong of the
Rabidue test). The EEOC notes that the requirement of psychological injury in hostile
environment sexual harassment actions may stem from a misreading of racial hostile envi-
ronment cases. Id. at 15-17. Cases like Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir.
1981), and Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denie 406 U.S. 957
(1972), discuss psychological injury to explain why hostile work environment actions are
available where no economic harm exists. Rabidue and its progeny transformed that lan-
guage into the actual injury requirement. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly held
that plaintiffs alleging a racially hostile environment need not show actual injury to estab-
lish a Title VII claim. Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1010 (1989).
92 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
93 Id. at 877-78. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association
at 9-11, Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168) [hereinafter APA
Brief] (presenting research demonstrating that the presence and degree of psychological
injury do not effectively measure the severity of the harassment).
94 EEOC Brief, supra note 91, at 20.
95 See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992);
Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1989). Cf Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring a showing that "the
alleged conduct injured this particular plaintiff," but the plaintiff must demonstrate only
that "the discrimination detrimentally affected" her).
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b. The Death of the Actual Injuy Test: Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.
In 1993, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the "actual in-
jury" test. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,96 which reversed a decision
from the Rabidue circuit,97 held that a sexual harassment victim need
not suffer psychological injury in order to prevail in a Title VII action.
Conduct that is "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive--" violates Title VII.98 The Court added
a mild subjective prong to this standard, stating that the victim must
"subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive"99 for the harass-
ment to alter the conditions of the victim's employment. Justice
O'Connor did not further clarify how this test should be applied, not-
ing that it is not "a mathematically precise test" and that "whether an
environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by look-
ing at all the circumstances." 100 Psychological harm is but one factor;
others include frequency and severity of conduct and whether the
work environment unreasonably interferes with the employee's
work.' 0 '
In some ways, Harris is only a small step forward.10 2 As Justice
Scalia and others have noted, it does not offer clear guidelines for
defining a hostile work environment. 03 It also fails to adopt a "rea-
96 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
97 The Sixth Circuit affirmed without opinion the district court's holding that plain-
tiff Theresa Harris did not demonstrate the requisite psychological injury. 976 F.2d 733
(6th Cir. 1992), aff'g without opinion 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 240 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). This reluctance to speak on the issue stems, according
to one commentator, from the Sixth Circuit's defensive posture regarding Rabidue and
resulting reluctance to make any quotable statements regarding sexual harassment. Anne
C. Levy, Sexual Harassment Cases in the 1990s: "Backlashing" the "Backlash" Through Title VII,
56 ALB. L. R-v. 1, 22 & n.112 (1992) (citing wave of Sixth Circuit sexual harassment opin-
ions from 1990 to 1992 not recommended for full-text publication).
98 Hanis, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 371. This vagueness worries Justice Scalia: "'Abusive' ... does not seem to
me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb
'objectively' or by appealing to a 'reasonable person's' notion of what the vague word
means." Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 371.
102 One commentator suggests that courts are still mired in a "personal injury" ap-
proach to sexual harassment that Harris failed to fully eliminate. Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile
Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectrity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY
LJ. 151, 192 (1994).
103 See supra note 100; see also Bettina B. Plevan, Harris Won't End Harassment Questions,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 19 (asserting that the Court missed an opportunity in Harris to
clarify hostile environment standards); Gayle S. Sanders & Susan C. Stanley, Courts Contem-
plate Harassment Claims After Harris Decision, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 28, 1994, at S10 (noting that
Harris does not clarify standards for evaluating a hostile work environment, and that subse-
quent cases have been decided on an ad hoc basis).
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sonable woman" or "reasonable victim" standard for evaluating a hos-
tile environment, as amici advocated.' 04 Its rejection of Rabidue's
"actual injury" requirement, however, reaffirms the evolving realiza-
tion of Title VII as a transforming social force. 10 5 The "actual injury"
test compromised Title VII's power to transform workplaces by unduly
focusing inquiry on the mental fortitude of discrimination victims. 106
Harris cements the notion that a primary aim of Title VII is to eradi-
cate gender-based hostility from the workplace, and that judicial in-
quiry in sexual harassment actions must focus on that goal.
4. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Although Title VII evolved during the 1970s and 1980s into a for-
midable remedial tool, a major obstacle remained that discouraged
sexual harassment victims from invoking it: many plaintiffs found that
bringing a Title VII action literally did not pay. Title VII permitted
gender discrimination victims to recover only modest equitable com-
pensation-back pay, an injunction against the discriminatory behav-
104 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Employment Law Center et al. at 8-16, Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168) (advocating adoption of a test focus-
ing on conduct that creates a hostile work environment as viewed by a reasonable woman
or victim). Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense Fund et al. at 21-22, Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168) (arguing that any "reasonableness"
standard, "whether couched in the language of a reasonable person or a reasonable
woman," misdirects Title VII inquiry).
105 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (noting that the
primary purpose of Title VII is to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to
remove long-standing barriers that favored white employees).
The Rabidue court acknowledged that Title VII exists to transform discriminatory
workplaces: the majority, quoting the district court below, characterized Title VII as "'the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female
workers of America.'" Id. at 621 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp.
419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (NewblattJ.), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). In the very next sentence, however, the court stated that "'it is
quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation
in the social mores of American workers.'" Id. (quoting 584 F. Supp. at 430).
To some extent, the Rabidue court acknowledged its error two years later in Davis v.
Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. den/Ae 490 U.S. 1110 (1989):
In reading [the Rabidue "magical transformation"] passage . . . one
should place emphasis on the word "magical," not the word "transforma-
tion." Title VII was not intended to eliminate immediately all private preju-
dice and biases. That law, however, did alter the dynamics of the workplace
because it operates to prevent bigots from harassing their co-workers....
In essence, while Title VII does not require an employer to fire all "Archie
Bunkers" in its employ, the law does require that an employer take prompt
action to prevent such bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that
abuses or offends their co-workers. By informing people that the expres-
sion of racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable, people may even-
tually learn that such views are undesirable in private, as well. Thus, Title
VII may advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and biases in our
society.
Id. at 350 (citations omitted).
106 See, e.g., APA Brief, supra note 93, at 11.
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ior, and reinstatement to their jobs. 107 Most sexual harassment
victims, however, lose far more than a salary and a job; at the very
least, they suffer humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of self esteem,
and many suffer more severe psychological and physical conse-
quences. 10 8 Courts, however, consistently rebuffed plaintiffs' attempts
to recover compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII.109
The 1991 Civil Rights Act provides a scheme through which vic-
tims of gender-based discrimination may better obtain redress. Its
prime goal is empowerment: Congress intended the Act to encourage
victims to act as "private attorneys general" in the effort to eradicate
workplace discrimination. 110 The Act permits victims of sex discrimi-
nation to pursue compensatory and punitive damages,"' though it
limits the amount of recoverable damages based on the number of
persons employed by the respondent firm.112 Plaintiffs may seek com-
pensation for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
non-pecuniary losses."" 3
Congressional reports on the 1991 Act recognize the obvious: vic-
tims of sexual harassment often lose moie than a few days' pay, a
serene work environment, or a job. 1 4 Victims naturally suffer emo-
107 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g) (1988).
108 See Gutek, supra note 33, at 848-50 (surveying studies of the negative consequences
of sexual harassment for women workers, which range from decreased job performance to
physical and emotional illness).
109 See, e.g., Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp 636, 643 (N.D.
Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed, 816 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1987).
110 H.R. REPt. No. 40(I), supra note 11, at 65, repinted in 1991 U.S.C.C-A-N. at 603.
1l 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993). If a plantiff seeks such damages, "any
party may demand a trial by jury." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1) (Supp. V 1993). See generally
DAVID A. CATHCART Er AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTs AcT OF 1991 9-14 (1993) (discussing the
portions of the 1991 Act pertaining to remedies and jury trials and assessing their potential
impact).
112
Number of employees Damages shall not exceed
15 - 100 $ 50,000
101 - 200 $100,000
201 - 500 $200,000
501 - $800,000
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (Supp. V 1998). The court may not inform the jury of these limi-
tations. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 11,
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 608 (noting that plaintiffs seeking redress for racial dis-
crimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) may pursue unlimited compensatory and puni-
tive remedies). Commentators initially speculated that the damage caps in the 1991 Act
would not survive for long. See CATHCART Er h., supra note 111 at 18 (outlining bills intro-
duced by Senators Kennedy and Hatch that would have eliminated or dramatically scaled
back the caps, and asserting that similar efforts by senators of "such widely divergent views
... suggests a broad legislative consensus"). To date, however, the caps remain in place.
113 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1998).
114 H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 11, rqrinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 608.
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tional distress and pain, for which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offered
little recourse. The 1991 Act remedies this shortcoming by providing
plaintiffs with the opportunity to be "made whole" without resorting
to tort action." 5 Plaintiffs must, however, meet "strict standards" to
recover compensatory damages: they must "prove actual injury or
loss."" 6 This requirement may significantly impact defendants' at-
tempts to compel plaintiffs to submit to a mental examination.
II
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL MENTAL
EXAMINATIONS
To compel a mental examination of an adverse party, the movant
must show that the mental condition of the party to be examined is
"in controversy."" 7 After Hais, a defendant cannot effectively argue
that a sexual harassment plaintiffs mere invocation of Title VII places
her mental condition in controversy, for a post-Harris plaintiff need
not show actual psychological injury to establish Title VII liability.""
The bulk of the factfinder's inquiry must focus not on how the plain-
tiff responded to workplace conditions, but on whether a reasonable
person would find those conditions hostile. Consequently, a plain'tiff
places her work environment-not her mental condition-in
controversy.
If, however, a plaintiff seeks damages for mental anguish under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, she must prove "actual injury or loss." Once
the factfinder finds liability, it must, to some extent, shift its inquiry to
the plaintiff's mental state to determine what compensable effect the
harassment had on her." 9 Consequently, a post-Harris defendant
could argue that a request for mental anguish damages automatically
places the plaintiff s mental condition at issue and provides the defen-
115 H.R. RE'. No. 40(I), supra note 11, at 65, 67, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 603,
605.
116 H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 11, at 72, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 610.
117 FED. P. Crv. P. 35(a).
118 Cf. Jan Hoffman, Plaintiffs 'Lavyers Applaud Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at
A22 (quoting attorney Sarah Bums' assertion that Harris eliminates "the impetus that was
gaining steam that a plaintiff would be opening herself up to a psychological examination
by alleging a hostile work environment"); Merrick Rossein, on The Week in Review (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1993) ("[W]hy [the elimination of the actual injury require-
ment] is so important is that often, when women would file complaints of sexual harass-
ment, employers' attorneys would then say, 'Your life is an open book, and we're going to
require you to have a mental examination,' and really attack a woman's character. That
will no longer be possible.").
119 Cf. Paul C. Sprenger, Current Discovery Issues in Sexual Harassment Claims, in SExuA .
HARASSMENT LInATION 1993, supra note 12, at 111, 123 (observing that discovery of medi-
cal information may be relevant to damages issues but not in the liability phase of a bifur-
cated trial).
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dant with good cause to explore that condition through a mental
examination.
This Part will demonstrate that this argument is at best over-
stated. Precedent and procedure rules forbid courts from routinely
compelling mental or physical examinations; rather, in each instance,
courts must carefully weigh the competing interests at stake. This Part
will briefly explore those interests and courts' treatment of them. It
will note that courts have found that a plaintiffs claims of emotional
distress or mental anguish do not necessarily grant a defendant li-
cense to compel a mental examination. It will then explore the
unique policy concerns that attend motions to compel sexual assault
and sexual harassment victims to submit to mental examinations.
Treatment of these motions has evolved: while courts and commenta-
tors once considered mental examinations necessary to protect falsely
accused defendants from deluded or vindictive victims, courts now ex-
press heightened concern for the privacy interests of sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs and the policy implications at stake.
A. Controversy and Cause: Historical Treatment of Motions to
Compel Medical Examinations
Attempts to compel litigants to submit to mental or physical ex-
aminations pit two powerful interests against one another: concern
for accuracy and fairness in the litigation process versus individuals'
right to privacy. Historically, concerns for litigants' privacy have pre-
vailed. In 1891, the Supreme Court held in Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford that federal courts had no inherent power to order medical
examinations.120 The Court stated that such examinations intrude
upon the "sacred ... inviolability of the person," and are especially
invasive to women.121 The dissenters contended that fairness de-
manded that personal injury defendants be allowed to examine
claimed injuries, asserting that "truth and justice are more sacred than
any personal consideration."122
Ultimately, the dissenters' position seemed to prevail. In 1938,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. 123 Discovery
provisions, 124 designed to promote fairness and unearth truth, in-
cluded Rule 35, which authorized courts to compel physical and
120 141 U.S. 250 (1891). Nine years later, however, the Court sanctioned federal court-
ordered examinations in states that allowed their courts to compel examinations. Camden
& Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900).
121 Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251-52.
122 Id. at 259 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
123 See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S.
645 (1938).
124 FED. R. Cmy. P. 26-37.
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mental examinations.1 25 Three years later, the Court upheld the
Rule's validity by a 5-4 vote.1 26 In time, the notion that medical exami-
nations inherently infringe upon sacred rights dissipated-in 1955,
one commentator accurately stated that "the argument that physical
examinations are of themselves an infringement of personal liberty is
today an anachronism."1 27 Concerns for litigants' privacy rights are,
however, written into Rule 35. The Rule does not allow examinations
as a matter of right; rather, it requires that the party seeking an exami-
nation show that the condition to be examined is "in controversy" and
that the movant has "good cause" to compel the examination. 28 Mo-
tions to compel examinations therefore receive greater judicial scru-
tiny than other discovery requests.
In Schlagenhauf v. Holder,129 the Supreme Court clarified the de-
gree to which courts must scrutinize motions to compel examinations
under Rule 35. The Court first stated that parties do not waive their
right to inviolability simply by seeking redress for injuries. 130 The
Court then held that Rule 35's "in controversy" and "good cause" re-
quirements "are not met by mere conclusory allegations of the plead-
ings-nor by mere relevance to the case-but require an affirmative
showing by the movant that each condition as to which the examina-
tion is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good
cause exists for ordering each particular examination."' 31 The Court
cautioned against routinely granting requests to compel Rule 35 ex-
aminations, demanding "a discriminating application by the district
125 308 U.S. at 708.
126 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court held that enacting Rule 35
did not exceed its power under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988), because
the rule did not impinge on substantive rights. 312 U.S. at 13. The Court reasoned that
the rule did not compromise important rights to freedom from bodily invasion because a
party is free to refuse to comply with the examination order. Id. at 14. Justice Frankfurter
vehemently dissented, protesting that compelled examinations are "an invasion of the per-
son," which thus "stand on a very different footing from [other discovery issues]." Id. at 18
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
127 RichardJ. Barnet, Compulsoiy Medical Examinations Under the Federal Rudes, 41 VA. L
REv. 1059, 1063 (1955).
128 The pertinent text of Rule 35 reads as follows:
ORDER FOR EXAMINATION.-When the mental or physical condition
... of a party... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending
may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner .... The order may be made only
on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be ex-
amined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, condi-
tions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it
is to be made.
FED. R. Crw. P. 35(a).
129 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
130 Id. at 113-14.
131 Id. at 118.
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judge of the limitations prescribed by [the Rule]."132 A movant thus
must produce sufficient information, through affidavits or even an evi-
dentiary hearing, to justify an examination. 133 However, in cases
where the plaintiff asserts a physical or mental injury in a negligence
action, the Court noted that "the pleadings alone" would generally
place her mental condition in controversy. 134
B. Pleadings, Privacy, and Probative Value: Contemporary
Treatment of Motions to Compel Physical and Mental
Examinations
When plaintiffs plead physical injury in a tort action, courts rou-
tinely order examinations based on the pleadings alone. 135 There is,
in such cases, little question either that the plaintiff's injury is in con-
troversy, or that, in most circumstances, 3 6 the defendant has good
cause to probe the plaintiff's condition. Assume, for instance, that a
plaintiff sought compensation for a broken back. The defendant
would need to employ a doctor to examine the injury and assess its
severity. Without a physical examination, the defense would be ham-
pered in its ability to rebut plaintiffs claims (which the plaintiffs ex-
pert witness would almost certainly support) that the injury was caused
in a certain way, was of a certain severity, caused a certain amount of
pain and discomfort, and would disable the plaintiff for a certain pe-
riod of time. An examination is the only way the expert can make the
necessary evaluations, and medical science is sufficiently advanced to
afford accurate diagnosis of most physical injuries. Thus, the expert's
scientific knowledge would aid the factfinder in determining issues of
causation and damages.137 Furthermore, the court would have little
trouble protecting the plaintiff from unwarranted invasions of privacy,
as it could circumscribe the scope of the examination by permitting
the expert to explore only the alleged back injury.
These obvious conclusions, however, do not extend to claims of
132 Id. at 121.
133 Id. at 119.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Lapera v. Shafron, 552 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (ordering Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging examination of slip-and-fall plaintiff).
136 Courts have, however, held that parties do not have good cause to compel unduly
risky or painful examinations. See, e.g., Stinchcomb v. United States, 132 F.R.D. 29 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (refusing to order a spinal tap, brain scan, and other tests requiring sedation and
immobilization of a ten-year-old, brain-damaged plaintiff).
137 FED. R. EVID. 702 sets the standard for admissibility of expert testimony. "If scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wimess qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
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emotional distress, mental anguish, or pain and suffering.13 8 Both
state and federal courts have frequently held that such claims do not
place a party's mental condition in sufficient controversy to warrant
an examination. For instance, one state appellate court has noted
that pain and suffering are common experiences, and thus "psychiat-
ric apple polishing" will do little to aid the factfinder in assessing the
harm. 3 9 Similarly, in Coates v. Whittington,140 the Texas Supreme
Court refused to compel an examination of a personal injury plaintiff
who claimed mental anguish commensurate with her physical injuries,
reasoning that plaintiffs should not be found to waive their deep pri-
vacy interests simply because they seek compensation for mental
anguish associated with an injury.141 Other courts have also held that
general allegations of distress and anguish, while compensable, are
not claims of specific psychiatric injury, and thus do not put the claim-
ant's mental condition in controversy. 142 Courts have also denied ex-
aminations when plaintiffs claim that their injuries were suffered
wholly in the past, obviating the need for a current examination. 143
Finally, several of these courts have noted that plaintiffs did not plan
138 An example of courts' greater reluctance to order mental examinations is Stuart v.
Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Okla. 1967). The court granted a physical examination of a
tort plaintiff but refused to order a mental examination despite plaintiff's claims for dam-
ages for emotional distress and mental anguish. Id. at 592-93. Stating that it was "not fully
satisfied that the mental condition of the plaintiff is in controversy or that good cause has
been shown for [a mental] examination," the court requested a report from the doctor
conducting the physical examination as to the need for a mental examination. Id. at 593.
139 Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 165, 167-68 (I1. App. Ct. 1966) ("Pain
and suffering to a greater or less [sic] degree is the common experience of mankind.
Juries understand it. We doubt that any psychiatric apple polishing will aid it... ."). The
court noted that pain and suffering and similar "mental" conditions are at least collaterally
at issue in many actions, and that to allow examinations in such cases "is to permit time
consuming excursions into the hinterlands of speculation and to lose sight of the main
event in the big tent while fiddling around with the side shows." Id. at 167.
140 758 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1988).
141 Id. at 752. California discovery rules mandate a similar outcome: state law prohib-
its mental examinations, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, where a party
stipulates that "no claim is being made for mental and emotional distress over and above
that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed, and no expert testimony regard-
ing this... distress will be presented at trial." CA. CI. PROC. CODE § 2032(d) (West Supp.
1995).
142 See, e.g., Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1984); Tyler v. Dis-
trict Court, 561 P.2d 1260, 1262-63 (Colo. 1977) (holding that general allegations of
mental suffering and mental anguish are not allegations of injury).
143 See, e.g., Winters v. Travia, 495 F.2d 839, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1974) (vacating the trial
court's order compelling a mental examination of a plaintiff claiming no present mental
injuries beyond an "unpleasant memory"); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958) (affirming trial court's discretion to deny motion to compel exami-
nation of a plaintiff claiming past physical and emotional suffering); Benchmaster, Inc. v.
Kawaelde, 107 F.R.D. 752, 754 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (disallowing examination of plaintiff con-
cerning his past mental condition because psychiatric testimony concerning that period
would be speculative); Tyler, 561 P.2d at 1263; see also Hodges v. Keane, 145 F.R.D. 332, 334-
35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (affirming that allegations of past emotional suffering do not necessar-
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to have a psychiatrist testify on their behalf at trial, a factor which
counsels against finding their mental condition in controversy.'4
Conversely, courts that have found a plaintiff's mental condition
to be in controversy generally do so when plaintiffs seek high damage
awards for severe, ongoing mental injuries and plan to have a friendly
psychiatrist testify at trial. 145 In such cases, psychiatric testimony is
more likely to aid ajury in assessing the cause and extent of the injury.
In addition, fairness dictates that defendants have an opportunity to
rebut the plaintiffs expert.146
Even if a plaintiff places her condition in controversy, procedural
rules demand that the party seeking to compel an examination show
good cause for that examination. 147 The movant thus must show that
the information sought cannot be found through less intrusive discov-
ery techniques. 48 If a court determines that the movant has already
obtained the necessary information from other discovery sources, it
will deny the motion to compel the examination. 149 Furthermore,
ily place plaintiff's condition in controversy, but ordering an examination because plain-
tiff's documented mental illness raised concern that he fabricated his claim).
144 See, e.g., Cody, 103 F.R.D. at 422 (denying examination, but stating that an examina-
tion might be permitted if plaintiff uses psychological testimony at trial); Stuart v. Burford,
42 F.R.D. 591, 593 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (stating that plaintiff did not intend to use psychiatric
testimony at trial and did not claim to suffer from "a mental psychosis, mental aberration
or other mental disease"); Coates, 758 S.W.2d at 752.
145 See, e.g. Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Co., 151 F.R.D. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1993)
(ordering examinations of plaintiffs who requested almost $2 million each and offered
psychiatrist's deposition to support claims of specific mental trauma); Tomlin v. Holecek,
150 F.R.D. 628, 630 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding "in controversy" the mental condition of a
plaintiff who alleged severe and permanent mental injuries and asserted that his treating
psychologists would testify); Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (noting
that mental examinations may not be warranted in "routine" emotional distress cases, but
that plaintiff s allegations of severely debilitating injury precluded categorizing the case as
routine).
146 But see Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(denying compelled examination even though plaintiffs planned to have their psychother-
apist testify).
147 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
148 See Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (denying request for psy-
chiatric examination because "[plaintiff]'s privacy interests require, at a minimum, that
less intrusive methods of discovery first be explored"); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 118 (1964) (noting that "[t]he ability of the movant to obtain the desired infor-
mation by other means is also relevant").
'49 For example, in Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1990), the
court found that the defendant did not show good cause when the plaintiff had retained
an expert to conduct an examination, and the defendant had deposed the expert and
submitted interrogatories and document requests to him, thus providing the defendant
with the information needed. See also Prevost v. Taylor, 396 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (denying motion for examination where information could have been obtained
from other available sources); Williams v. Smith, 576 So. 2d 448, 452 (La. 1991) (holding
that defendant failed to show good cause to compel an examination when defendant had
deposed plaintiffs physician repeatedly and had received responses to interrogatories and
requests for document production). But cf. Everly v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 89-
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courts may also find good cause lacking if a movant attempts to sub-
ject a party to repeated and cumulative examinations. 150
Finally, even if movants satisfy the "in controversy" and "good
cause" requirements, courts retain discretion to deny or limit the
scope of proposed examinations. 15 1 If, for example, the examining
expert seeks to use unreliable evaluative techniques, the court may
deny the motion. In Usher v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing
Co.,15 2 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered a
psychiatric evaluation of a sex discrimination plaintiff, but refused to
allow the defendant to conduct a battery of psychological tests. The
court accepted the plaintiff's demonstration of "the inadequacy of the
correlation factors and the validity factors of all" the tests at issue.153
Thus, according to the court, while the tests might uncover relevant
evidence, the probative value of such evidence "'is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury."'5
Despite the Supreme Court's conclusion that a claim of mental
injury in a negligence action will generally place the claimant's mental
condition in controversy, 55 courts have often concluded that a claim
of mental anguish does not place the pleader's mental condition in
controversy. Furthermore, courts have adhered to Schlagenhauf s man-
date that defendants show good cause for compelling an examination.
C1712, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1255, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1991) (allowing examination
after defendant's review of plaintiff's psychiatric records proved "not sufficiently informa-
tive"); Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (granting defendant's exami-
nation request after defendant's expert perused other records and formed opinions
adverse to plaintiff's claims).
150 See, e.g., Moore v. Calavar Corp., 142 F.R.D. 134 (W.D. La. 1992); Price v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., No. 91-5864, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18695 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1991) (denying
defendant's request for fourth psychiatric examination of plaintiff); Loveland v. Kremer,
464 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (vacating trial court's order of second adverse
medical examination of plaintiff that would evaluate same injury as the first).
151 See, e.g., Stinchcomb v. United States, 132 F.R.D. 29, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Hardy v.
Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (N.D. Miss. 1970). Rule 35 dictates that the court "may
order" an examination and that the order "shall specify the ... scope of the examination."
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) (emphasis added).
152 158 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
153 Id. at 413. In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff had "by far the better of the
argument," id. at 414, the court relied upon the factors for evaluating expert testimony
announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
Daubert counsels courts to consider, among other things, "the known or potential rate of
error" of a proposed expert evaluation. 113 S.Ct at 2797.
154 158 F.R.D. at 413 (citing FED. R. Evm. 403). The court further noted that
"'[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against proba-
tive force ... exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.'" Id. (quoting
Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended,
138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). For further discussion of the questionable validity and relia-
bility of psychological testing, see infra note 253.
155 See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Finally, even where defendants meet the requirements of Rule 35,
courts have curtailed potentially invasive examinations of dubious
value to the factfinding process. Thus, while the notion that medical
examinations are per se an invasion of liberty rights has faded, 156
courts have remained vigilant in assessing whether a proposed adverse
mental examination would unduly intrude upon a party's privacy
rights.
C. Treatment of Motions to Compel Sexual Misconduct
Accusers to Submit to Mental Examinations
Motions to compel mental examinations of women who allege
sexual misconduct have long aroused particularly acute concerns.
Unlike other criminal or intentionally tortious behavior, sexual activ-
ity is obviously not condemned in and of itself. Therefore, defendants
in sexual misconduct cases frequently do not contest that sexual be-
havior occurred, but rather attest that the complainant acted as if she
welcomed the behavior, or perhaps that she overreacted to "normal"
sexual horseplay. Moreover, sexual misconduct cases frequently
amount to "he said, she said" credibility contests. 157 Hence, the sex-
ual proclivities and veracity of the complainant become relevant to
some degree. A sexual misconduct defendant may thus have cause to
explore those issues through a mental examination.
On the other hand, exploring sexual history and credibility
through a psychiatric examination implicates powerful policy con-
cerns. The SchlagenhaufCourt held that a complainant does not waive
her substantive right to privacy simply by seeking legal redress for inju-
ries.158 The Supreme Court has subsequently held that people have a
fundamental right of privacy upon which the state may not encroach
absent a compelling interest.159 A searching examination of a com-
156 See supra text accompanying note 127.
157 See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding in favor of complainant, who claimed that her boss demanded oral sex in his
closed office; the boss denied the claims); Hall v. F.O. Thacker Contracting Co., 24 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding in favor of a supervisor who denied
his secretary's charge that he privately offered her $5000 per week to sleep with him); see
also Alex Kozinski, Forward to LINDEMANN & KADuE, supra note 36, at vii ("[C]harges of
sexual harassment, like those of rape, child molestation and spousal abuse, can raise some
of the most difficult problems of proof in the law, because some of the most egregious
conduct... occurs in private, with the participants doubling as the only witnesses.").
158 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
159 The Court first explicitly recognized the fundamental right to privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing marital right of privacy). See also Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending right of procreative autonomy to individuals,
whether married or unmarried); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)
(finding an unreasonable blood test would be an infringement of the right of privacy).
Several state constitutions explicitly provide a right of privacy. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 22; CAL CONsr. art. 1, § 1; HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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plainant's psyche and sexual history implicates this right.160 Further-
more, courts and legislatures have increasingly expressed concern
that the specter of a compelled mental examination may deter victims
from reporting sexual misconduct, and that such inquiry unduly fo-
cuses on the complainant rather than on the misconduct for which
she seeks redress.
The balance of this Part will focus on how these competing con-
cems have informed judicial treatment of motions to compel mental
examinations of sexual misconduct complainants. It will first briefly
discuss mental examinations of sexual assault victims in criminal cases.
As rape law reform has taken hold, treatment of motions to compel
such examinations has transformed: while influential commentators
once considered such examinations essential, they are now roundly
prohibited. This transformation has influenced the scope of permissi-
ble discovery in sexual harassment cases. 161
1. Sexual Assault Victims
Traditionally, courts and commentators expressed profound con-
cern that rape charges are difficult to refute, and that deluded or vin-
dictive women might ruin men's reputations by unjustly accusing
them of rape.162 Throughout much of this century, commentators ad-
vocated that sexual assault complainants undergo psychiatric exami-
nations to assess their credibility and to guard against false claims. 1 63
160 Cf. Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the right of privacy
encompasses the right to refuse to submit to an unreasonable psychiatric examination).
161 See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761-62 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (invoking rationale of
federal rape shield law to exclude discovery of plaintiffs past sexual conduct).
162 See supra note 19.
163 John Henry Wigmore recommended that all female rape victims be required to
undergo psychiatric examinations. 3A JOHN HENRY WroMoRE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 737
(Chadbourn rev. 1970) ("No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury
unless the female complainants's social history and mental makeup have been examined
and testified to by a qualified physician."). Wigmorejustified his recommendation by not-
ing that "[m]odem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifa-
rious .... " Id. at 736; see also id. at 740-46 (citing case studies and letters from mental
health experts to support recommendation). For detailed criticism of Wigmore's use and
misuse of authority to support his claims, see Leigh B. Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John
Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAT- W. L. REv.
235 (1983). In 1938, the American Bar Association adopted the following statement:
Today it is unanimously held ... by experienced psychiatrists that the com-
plainant woman in a sex offense should always be examined by competent
experts to ascertain whether she suffers from some mental or moral delu-
sions or tendency, frequently found especially in young girls, causing distor-
tion of the imagination in sex cases.
Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 REP. A.BA. 570, 588 (1938).
Later commentators supported these recommendations to varying degrees. See, e.g.,
CHARI.s T. McCoRINCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 45, at 99 (1954) (support-
ing Wigmore's position, citing the "special danger of sympathy swaying judgment on credi-
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Contemporary courts, legislatures, and commentators have rejected
this idea.'6 4 Courts seldom compel examinations of adult sexual as-
sault complainants because the specter of such probing is likely to de-
ter victims from reporting crimes, thwarting the state's compelling
interest in enforcing the law.' 65 Courts have also held that such mo-
tions invade the complainant's right to privacy. 166 Several courts have
bility in sex cases"); Michael Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A
Suggested Approach, 48 CAL. L REV. 648, 673-76 (1960) (advocating examinations because
rape prosecutions are "especially likely to involve pathological witnesses," but stating that
"full-fledged psychiatric evaluation of the credibility of complaining witnesses in every pros-
ecution for a sexual offense should be postponed" until "other problems... are solved");
Tommy W.Jarrett, Note, Criminal Law-Psychiatric Examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case, 45
N.C. L. REv. 234, 240 (1966) (supporting approach allowing courts to order examinations
of rape complainants if circumstances dictate); Luther C. McKinney, Comment, Pre-Trial
Psychiatric Examination as Proposed Means for Testing the Complainant's Competenc to Alkge Sex
Offense, 1957 U. IL.. LF. 651, 654 (calling for legislation mandating examinations unless
"other available evidence strongly corroborates the complainant's story"); Recent Case, Psy-
chiatric Aid in Evaluating Credibility of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 IND. LJ. 98, 101-
02 (1950) (advocating rule permitting prosecutors to seek examinations of rape complain-
ants "where strong corroborative evidence is not available").
164 Courts in most states permit trial judges to order examinations of rape complain-
ants, but only if compelling reasons exist for such an examination. Gregory B. Sarno,
Annotation, Necessiy or Permissibility of Mental Examination to Determine Competency or Credibil-
ity of Complainant in Sexual Offense Prosecution, 45 A.L.R.4th 310, § 3(a) (1986 & Supp.
1994). Many of these courts have been overtly critical of Wigmore's recommendation. See,
e.g., State v. Romero, 606 P.2d 1116, 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (asserting that the notion
that mental examinations "should be routinely ordered in rape cases... is based on out-
moded notions of the instability and duplicity of women in general and, as such, should be
discarded altogether"); State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 622 (N.C. 1978) (deeming Wig-
more's recommendation "completely unreasonable and unsound"); Forbes v. State, 559
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977) ("[W]e... reject the notion advanced by Wigmore .... ).
California and Illinois statutes prohibit courts from ordering mental examinations of vic-
tims of sex crimes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West Supp. 1995); 725 ILCS 5/115-7.1
(1994). For commentary critical of Wigmore's position, see RobertaJ. O'Neale, Court Or-
dered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape Vctim in a Criminal Rape Prosecution-Or How Many
Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18 SANTA CL.ARA I REv. 119 (1978); J.G. Bangle & LA.
Haage, Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims: A Reevaluation, 15 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 973 (1982).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that
the prospect of facing a mental examination "may well deter the victim of [rape] from
lodging any complaint at all"); United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 343 (D.D.C. 1966)
("The continuous accumulation of intimidating and indelicate procedural probings tend
[sic] to induce to silence all but the most hardened victims."); People v. Browning, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 293, 296 (Ct. App. 1980) (noting that if rape victims had to submit to psychiatric
examinations, few rapes would be reported). For an argument that this deterrent effect
has been overemphasized, see Judith Greenberg, Note, Compulsory PsychologicalExamination
in Sexual Offense Cases: Invasion of Privacy or Defendant's Right?, 58 FoanHAM I REv. 1257,
1261 (1990).
166 See, e.g., Benn, 476 F.2d at 1131 ("[A] psychiatric examination may seriously im-
pinge on a witness' right to privacy; the trauma that attends the role of complainant to sex
offense charges is sharply increased by the indignity of a psychiatric examination; the ex-
amination itself could serve as a tool of harassment.... "); Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 627 (hold-
ing that the invasion of the victim's right to privacy and the public interest in encouraging
victims to report rape outweigh the possible benefits of an examination to an innocent
defendant).
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appealed to the spirit of rape shield rules to support denial of psychi-
atric examinations of sexual assault victims.' 67
2. Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs
Courts have expressed similar concerns when addressing motions
to compel psychiatric examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs. In
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,' 68 the District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida summarized these concerns, cautioning that
plaintiffs facing a mental examination in a Title VII case "would face
sexual denigration in order to secure their statutory right to be free
from sexual denigration." 69 Furthermore, the specter of such exami-
nations may deter harassment victims from bringing suit, thereby
thwarting the strong public interest in eradicating sexual harassment.
However, arguments in favor of compelling psychiatric examina-
tions of sexual harassment plaintiffs, or of at least not presumptively
barring them, are stronger in civil sexual harassment actions than in
rape prosecutions. A rape complainant is not a party to an action, but
a witness.'70 In addition, examinations of rape complainants are usu-
ally geared towards assessing credibility, a collateral issue; therefore, a
rape victim's mental condition is not directly in controversy.' 7 ' A civil
sexual harassment plaintiff, however, arguably places her mental con-
dition squarely in controversy, at least if she seeks damages for mental
injuries.
Courts have attempted to draw bright-line rules to handle Rule 35
motions in sexual harassment actions. Generally, plaintiffs who seek
equitable remedies under Title VII do not place their mental condi-
tion in sufficient controversy to warrant an examination; 7 2 those seek-
167 See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding the
trial court's reliance on the spirit of the federal rape shield rule in denying psychiatric
examination of rape complainant); State v. Tomlinson, 515 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ohio 1986)
("[R]equiring victims to undergo psychiatric evaluations prior to being permitted to testify
violates the spirit of [Ohio's rape shield statute] by subjecting the victim to an intense
probing of his or her prior sexual experiences."); Commonwealth v. Widrick, 467 N.E.2d
1358, 1357 (Mass. 1984).
168 118 F.R.D. 525 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
169 Id. at 531 (citing CATHAX NE A. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODFIED 114 (1987)).
170 See Bangle & Haage, supra note 164, at 983.
171 Id.
172 See Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525 (M.D. Fla. 1988); see also
Jennings v. DHL Airlines, 101 F.R.D. 549 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (quashing subpoena of the
records of complainant's psychologist because Title VII plaintiff did not place her mental
condition in controversy). At least one court has held that the Robinson rationale applies to
cases where plaintiffs seek damages for past mental suffering under state civil rights law.
See Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 221-222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying
examination). But see Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 101 F.R.D. 296, 298-99 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (allowing mental examination of racial harassment complainant who sought dam-
ages for emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
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ing tort remedies generally do.' 73
a. Title VI Plaintiffs
The leading Title VII case considering a motion to compel a psy-
chiatric examination is Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.'74 Lois
Robinson, a welder, alleged that rampant pornography at her work
site caused her emotional distress.175 She sought back pay for work
days lost due to her distress, as well as injunctive and declaratory re-
lief.176 The defendant, attempting to prove that the plaintiff was hy-
persensitive to pornography, moved to compel a psychiatric
examination. 77 The court denied the motion. It stated that, to estab-
lish her claim, the plaintiff must satisfy an objective standard: she
must prove that she endured harassment which "could be objectively
classed as the kind that would seriously affect the psychological well
being of a reasonable individual." 178 Because this standard focuses on
"'the defendant's conduct, not the plaintiff's perception or reaction
to [that] conduct,'-a79 the court stated that "application of [the objec-
tive standard] is not informed by evidence which may be obtained in a
mental examination." 80 The court consequently held that the plain-
tiff did not place her mental condition in controversy.' 8 '
The court thus established that Title VII inquiry focuses on the
harassing conduct, obviating the need to explore the accuser's mental
condition. Furthermore, the court recognized that the plaintiff's pri-
vacy concerns are enmeshed with the public policy concerns underly-
ing Title VII: if the court allows undue mental examinations, it would
not only deprive the plaintiff of her right to be free from sexual deni-
gration, but would also "undercut[ ] the remedial effect intended by
Congress in enacting Title VII" by discouraging victims from bringing
valid claims.' 8 2 The court noted, however, that its response to the mo-
173 See, e.g., Everly v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. 89-C-1712, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1255, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1991) (holding that plaintiff's claims for mental and psychiat-
ric injuries placed her mental condition in controversy); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585
F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (noting that claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress placed plaintiff's mental condition in controversy), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986); Brandenberg v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79
F.R.D. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987).
174 118 F.R.D. 525 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
175 Id. at 526.
176 Id. Ms. Robinson initially sought compensation under tort law for her emotional
distress, but later dropped this claim. Id.
177 Id. The magistrate in the case initially granted the defendant's motion. Id.
178 Id. at 530.






NOTE-CIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
tion to compel the mental examination would likely have been differ-
ent had the plaintiff sought compensation for emotional distress in a
pendent tort action, as such a claim would have been more likely to
put her mental condition in controversy.'8 3
b. Tort Claimants
Courts generally have agreed with the Robinson court's tort/non-
tort distinction. Most courts that have considered the issue have held
that sexual harassment plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages for
emotional distress and psychiatric injuries under tort law place their
mental condition in sufficient controversy to warrant a mental
examination. 184
i. Examination Granted: Vinson v. Superior Court
A seminal decision by the California Supreme Court, Vinson v.
Superior Court,'8 5 displays reasoning typical in the line of cases order-
ing mental examinations of tort plaintiffs. The plaintiff alleged that
harassment by an interviewer under whom she eventually worked
caused her continuing emotional distress, loss of sleep, anxiety,
mental anguish, humiliation, and reduced self-esteem, for which she
sought compensation under state tort law.'86 Interpreting a proce-
dural rule similar to Rule 35,187 the court held that her claims of "vari-
ous mental and emotional ailments" placed her mental state in
controversy.18 Furthermore, the court stated that her claim that the
defendant caused her severe psychiatric injury implicitly asserted that
her injuries were not caused by a preexisting mental condition; she
had therefore provided the defendant with good cause to explore
other potential causes of her injuries. 189 The court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that the state's interest in eradicating sexual harass-
ment by encouraging victims to bring suit should exempt harassment
plaintiffs from mental examinations. 190 The court reasoned that the
state does not have a "greater interest in preventing emotional distress
in sexual harassment victims than it has in preventing such distress in
the victims of any other tort."' 91
The Vinson court limited its holding in two respects. First, it re-
183 Id. at 528.
184 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
185 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987).
186 Id. at 407.
187 CAL. CM. PRoc. CODE § 2032(a) (West 1986) (repealed 1987) (requiring that con-
dition be "in controversy" and that "good cause" exist for the examination).
188 740 P.2d at 409.
189 Id. at 409-10.




stricted the scope of the examination, holding that the plaintiffs right
to privacy precluded the defendant from exploring her sexual history
and practices. 192 Second, the court stated in dicta that it would not
order an examination in a "simple sexual harassment claim asking
compensation for having to endure an oppressive work environment"
where the complainant did not seek monetary damages for ongoing
psychological injuries.'93
ii. Examination Denied: Cody v. Marriott Corp.
Not all courts have adhered to the tort/non-tort dichotomy ad-
vanced in Vinson and suggested in Robinson. In Cody v. Marriott
Corp.,194 the court considered a motion to compel a psychiatric exami-
nation of a sexual harassment plaintiff who sought damages for emo-
tional distress. Refuting the defendant's contention that "an
allegation of 'emotional distress' is synonymous with 'mental condi-
tion,"195 the court held that a claim for emotional distress damages
does not automatically place the plaintiffs mental condition in con-
troversy. The court distinguished a claim of emotional distress from a
claim of a psychiatric disorder requiring psychiatric or psychological
treatment and stated that it would likely order an examination if the
plaintiff secured the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist to testify
at trial on her behalf.196
D. Summary
While it has been criticized as sparsely reasoned, 197 Cody actually
harmonizes the rationales of the courts denying mental examinations
in tort, sexual assault, and statutory sexual harassment actions. 198 The
opinion consequently offers guidance for courts considering a motion
to compel a mental examination of a plaintiff seeking damages under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. First, the court embraced the reasoning
that tort plaintiffs do not necessarily place their mental conditions in
controversy if they merely claim mental distress rather than psychiat-
192 Id. at 411. However, the court refused to allow plaintiff's counsel to be present
during the examination, reasoning in part that an attorney would be unlikely to under-
stand the psychiatric relevance of the questioning. Id. at 412. See Amy C. Hirschkron,
Women and California Law, IV Employment Law, A. Sexual Harassment, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
Rav. 627, 631 (1988) (criticizing the court for failing to allow plaintiff's attorney to be
present during the examination because doing so would have "actively promote[d the
court's] stated policy of protecting the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs").
193 740 P.2d at 409.
194 103 F.R.D. 421 (D. Mass. 1984).
195 Id. at 422 n.2.
196 Id. at 423.
197 LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 36, at 560.
198 See id. at 560 n.45 (noting that the Cody court's reasoning "resembles that used in
sexual assault cases").
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ric injury, or if they do not intend to have a friendly psychiatrist testify,
or if they claim mental anguish commensurate with other demon-
strated injuries.199 Second, the court was mindful of the public policy
concerns and the plaintiff s privacy interests that have fueled reform
of sexual assault and sexual harassment law, and recognized that a
claim for anguish caused by discrimination does not render those con-
cerns irrelevant. 200 In addition-like Harris, Robinson, and the tide of
reform in sexual harassment law-Cody underscores that the primary
inquiry in hostile environment cases, does not demand an exploration
of the plaintiff's psyche. Taking these factors into consideration,
courts should view with strong skepticism a motion to compel a
mental examination of a Title VII plaintiff who seeks limited compen-
sation under the 1991 Civil Rights Act for mental anguish caused by
objectively hostile behavior.
III
CONSIDERATIONS FOR JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MOTIONS TO
COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE
"NEW" TITLE VII
Courts disagree as to whether and when plaintiffs claiming
mental distress may be compelled to submit to mental examinations.
Strong and evolving policy concerns counsel against ordering sexual
harassment plaintiffs to submit to such examinations. Nevertheless,
recent commentary suggests that a court need not deeply ponder a
motion to compel a mental examination of a hostile environment
plaintiff seeking statutory damages for anguish and distress.20 1 This
commentary seems to presume the following: To prevail on her claim
for compensation, a plaintiff must prove that the harassment caused
her actual mental injury and must give some evidence of the extent of
that injury. Her claim is, in essence, a tort claim. Thus, her pleadings
alone place her mental state in controversy and provide the defendant
with good cause to probe the extent and cause of her alleged injury.
This Part will argue that this issue is not so easily resolved. At a
minimum, Schlagenhauf mandates that courts scrutinize every Rule 35
motion.20 2 As noted above, a mental anguish claim does not automat-
ically place a claimant's mental condition in controversy. A court
199 See Cody, 103 F.R.D. at 423; supra notes 13844 and accompanying text.
200 103 F.R.D. at 422-23.
201 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
202 See Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1964) (admonishing against rou-
tine granting of Rule 35 motions). Recent commentary has noted that almost all plaintiffs
suing under Title VII will seek damages for emotional distress under the 1991 Act. See
supra note 31. Nearly all sexual harassment plaintiffs would thus be subject to an examina-
tion order, a result the Robinson court deemed "unacceptable." 118 F.R.D. at 531.
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must carefully balance the competing justifications for and against
granting the motion.203 In the process, it must thus consider crucial
questions: Is the plaintiff's mental condition really in controversy? Of
what significance is the fact that she seeks statutory rather than com-
mon-law compensation? What value will the examination offer the
factfinder and the defendant? Does the jury need expert assistance to
assess mental anguish damages? How important are the plaintiff's in-
terests in avoiding the examination?
This Part will propose and discuss issues that courts should con-
sider as they grapple with these questions and balance the interests of
the parties. It will first discuss the mental examination process and
the value of that process to the defendant and the factfinder. It will
then outline factors that call into question the need for mental exami-
nations in most sexual harassment actions where plaintiffs seek mental
anguish damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
A. Value of the Mental Examination to the Defendant and the
Factfinding Process
When adjudicating a Rule 35 motion, the court must first ex-
amine why the defendant feels it necessary to compel a mental exami-
nation and ascertain what will take place during the exam. Ostensibly,
the examination, which may be performed by anyone who is properly
licensed or certified, 204 allows the defendant to determine whether,
and to what extent, the plaintiff has been psychologically injured.20 5
Arguably, assessment of damages and causation are the only justifiable
purpose for a mental examination, as liability for creation of a hostile
work environment is determined according to the objective standard
endorsed by the Harris court; inquiry under such a standard is "not
informed by evidence which may be obtained in a mental examina-
tion.''20 6 Nevertheless, at least one defense-oriented commentator in-
203 See, e.g., Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters &Joiners, 126 F.R.D. 422, 425-26 (D.
Mass. 1989) (balancing the importance of the plaintiff's privacy interests against the defen-
dant's claimed need for discovery of plaintiff's psychiatric records).
204 The Rule was amended in 1991 to permit any qualified person, rather than just
physicians and psychologists, to conduct examinations. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 35 advisory com-
mittee's note.
205 To assess the "damage" done to a sexual harassment plaintiff, a forensic psychiatrist
will probe into her reaction to the harassment-typical reactions range from discomfort to
depression and paranoia-and note symptoms of diagnosable psychiatric disorders as
found in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, see supra note 6. Renee L. Binder, Sexual Harasswment: IssuesforForensic Psychiatrists,
20 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 409, 413-14 (1992). It is important to note that even
"[s]evere distress is not equivalent to and does not necessarily result in a psychiatric diag-
nosis." Eric H. Marcus, Sexual Harassment Claims: Who is a Reasonable Woman, 44 LAMBOR
LJ. 646, 648 (1993). A victim thus can experience considerable levels of compensable
distress without suffering diagnosable "injury."
206 Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 531.
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sists that clinicians should inquire beyond damages to issues that
"might provide the very basis of the claim itself."20 7 The defendant
may thus desire to use the examination to uncover a plaintiffs at-
tempts at and motives for fabricating or embellishing her claim, to
determine whether she falsely attributes psychological trauma result-
ing from outside stressors to the workplace, and to reveal whether she
tends to be hypersensitive to sexual stimuli.208
Accomplishing these objectives requires an extensive and broad-
ranging examination. Psychiatrist Sara Feldman-Schorrig and attor-
ney James McDonald recommend that a clinician use five separate
methods when performing an examination.20 9 The examiner first as-
sesses the credibility of the plaintiff, looking for three types of falsifica-
tion: lies, pathological lies, and delusions.210 Second, he records the
plaintiff's version of the history of her injury, fully exploring any con-
tradictions or inconsistencies.21' Third, the examiner explores the
plaintiff's psycho-social history, focusing on early interpersonal rela-
tions-especially dysfunctional ones-adolescent sexual activities, atti-
tudes toward men, and sexual practices.212 Fourth, the examiner
assesses the plaintiffs mental status based on the sum of the exam-
207 Sara P. Feldman-Schorrig, Special Issues in Sexual Harassment Cases, in MENTAL AND
EMoTIoNAL INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT LTIGATION 332, 332 (James J. McDonald, Jr. &
Francine B. Kulick eds., 1994).
208 Sara P. Feldman-Schorrig &JamesJ. MacDonald,Jr., The Role of Forensic Psychiatry in
the Defense of Sexual Harassment Cases, 20J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 7-8 (1992); see also MARTIN
BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAw § 5.22e, at 28-31 (3d ed. Supp.
1993) (noting that many allegations of sexual harassment prove to be unsupportable be-
cause psychiatric examinations reveal that claimants (1) fabricate emotional damage, (2)
are clinically paranoid, (3) unconsciously displace unrelated trauma, and thus overact to
benign incidents, (4) suffer from a personality disorder, causing them to create the harass-
ing situation, or (5) are hypersensitive or hypervigilant to sexual stimuli).
209 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 23-28.
210 Id. at 23-26. While Feldman-Schorrig and McDonald state that clinicians are
trained to recognize these types of falsification, studies indicate that psychiatrists are no
better at lie detection than laypersons. See, e.g., Paul Elkman & Maureen O'Sullivan, W%
Can Catch a Liar?, 46 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 913 (1991) (finding that, among a sample of psy-
chiatrists, law enforcement personnel, and others, only Secret Service agents performed
better than chance in detecting lying). Mental health professionals generally agree that,
"[clontrary to popular belief, [they have] no magical powers by which to discern truthful-
ness or exaggeration." Marcus, supra note 205, at 648. See also RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIA-
TRY AND _AW 54 (1973) ("A sharp poker player probably knows better than a psychiatrist
whether a person is lying .... A psychiatrist is a doctor, not a lie detector."); Edward
Dolnick & Benedict Carey, The Great Pretender, HEALTH, July-Aug. 1992, at 30, 32 (quoting
psychiatrist Gordon Deckert "[Pathological liars] can look you right in the eye and with-
out a hint of discomfort tell you the most blatant lies.... There's no way you can pick it
up."). In expressing his doubt that psychiatric testimony would have shed much light on
Clarence Thomas's nomination hearings, psychiatrist Paul Applebaum stated that
"[p]sychiatric evaluations are good at telling you lots of things, but whether people are
lying or telling the truth is not one of them." Andrew Rosenthal et al., Psychiatry's Use in
Thomas Battle Raises Ethics Issue, N.Y. TnmEs, Oct. 20, 1991, § 1, at 23.
211 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 26.
212 Id. at 26. For an exegesis of a forensic psychiatrist's strategy in taking a personal
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iner's observations and impressions. 213 Finally, the examiner runs the
plaintiff through a battery of personality tests to determine, among
other things, whether she is exaggerating or concealing
psychopathology. 214
A defendant's reasons for subjecting a plaintiff to such a search-
ing examination are simple: the plaintiff has claimed that she has
been mentally harmed by sexual misconduct. She may be exaggerat-
ing this claim, or faking it entirely. Or perhaps she is not faking her
anguish, but erroneously attributing it to the workplace rather than to
the outside stressors that actually caused the distress. Maybe she is
hypersensitive to sexual cues, or has a personality disorder that led her
to create the situations which gave rise to her claims. The defendant
would claim that, by seeking compensation for mental anguish, the
history, see MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAw § 3.2, at 80-82
(3d ed. 1992).
FeIdman-Schorrig and McDonald acknowledge that a clinician may not be permitted
to take as extensive a personal history as they advocate if the court follows Vinson's refusal
to allow psychiatric inquiry into a plaintiff's sexual history and practices. Feldman-Schorrig
& McDonald, supra note 208, at 26 n.75. They assert that their article demonstrates that
such inquiry is relevant, and that in most circumstances, defendants should be able to
discover such evidence. Id. The authors renew this claim in a later piece, but recognize
that a "plaintiff's voluntary sexual conduct outside the workplace involving persons other
than her coworkers would ordinarily be of little use in determining whether sexual harass-
ment occurred as alleged." James J. McDonald, Jr. & Sara P. Feldman-Schorrig, The Re-
vance of Childhood Sexual Abuse in Sexual Harassnnt Cases, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 221, 233
(1994). They insist, however, that evidence of childhood sexual abuse should be routinely
discoverable in sexual harassment actions. Id. at 231-34.
213 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 27. The authors counsel the
examiner to be vigilant in attempting to ferret out the "true causes" of the plaintiff's dis-
tress and potential ulterior motives for pursuing her claim. Id. at 23. Dr. Blinder notes
that the examiner must make objective observations during the mental status examination
(MSE). BLINDER, supra note 208, § 3.3, at 82-83. The examiner's role as the defendant's
agent could cloud that objectivity and skew the results of the MSE. See DANIEL W. SHUMAN,
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE § 2.14, at 46 (1986) (noting that the MSE is a
highly subjective affair which is influenced largely by factors extraneous to the examinee's
personality; thus, "[a] careless or biased interviewer can literally create the kind of patients
expected"); Marcus, supra note 205, at 649 (noting that "[i]t is not at all unusual" for
opposing forensic examiners to make opposite findings based on MSEs, and that unrecog-
nized "value judgments... can lead to a gross distortion of the findings").
214 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 27. Personality tests are divided
into two categories: psychometric (objective) and projective (subjective) tests. BLINDER,
supra note 208, § 16.3, at 793-94. In the best-known and most commonly used psychomet-
ric test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the subject responds to
an extensive series of true-false questions. Id. For a thorough discussion of courtroom use
of the MMPI and various revised versions, see KENNETH S. POPE, THE MMPI, MMPI-2 &
MMPI-A IN COURT (1993). In the best known projective personality test, the Rorschach,
the subject interprets a series of inkblots on cards. The answers to each type of test, as
interpreted by the clinician, form the basis for a psychological profile of the subject.
BLINDER, supra note 208, § 16.3, at 794. See also id. app. e, at 893-95 (listing other psycho-
logical tests). For an exhaustive collection of studies criticizing the validity and reliability
of psychometric and projective psychological tests, see 2JAY ZisIIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TFSrtMONY 523-684 (4th ed. 1988).
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plaintiff has put all these "maybes" at issue.2 15 A mental examination,
the defendant would argue, offers the best way to turn each of those
"maybes" into a "yes" or a "no."
B. Policy, Probative Value, and Privacy: Factors Counseling
Against Mental Examination Orders
The balance of this Part will present reasons why a court should
say "no" to a defendant's motion to compel a sexual harassment plain-
tiff to submit to a mental examination. First, an action for damages
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not a tort action and should not
be treated as such. Instead, the strong policy concerns embodied in
the 1991 Act should dictate limits on the need for medical testimony
to support mental anguish claims and thus should limit the propriety
of compelled mental examinations in modem sexual harassment ac-
tions. Second, psychiatrists and psychologists are ill-equipped to offer
substantial aid to factfinders in determining the presence and extent
of mental anguish or emotional distress. Third, much of the focus of
an adverse mental examination seems to be not on gauging emotional
injury, but on assessing the credibility of the plaintiff, an area where
courts generally do not allow experts to aid the trier of fact. Finally,
the use of mental examinations in sexual harassment actions impli-
cates special concerns for plaintiffs' privacy and paves the way for un-
checked discovery abuse. Taken together, these considerations
counsel against compelling plaintiffs to submit to mental examina-
tions, or at least in favor of dramatic limits on the scope of such exam-
inations, in many actions for damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
1. The Thumb on the Scale: Policy, Standards of Proof and the
Inference of Emotional Harm in Discrimination Actions
The idea that a plea for mental anguish damages under the 1991
Act should be treated the same as a similar tort claim makes intuitive
sense. After all, the 1991 Act essentially seems to "tortifW' Title VII. 2 16
Because most courts considering the issue have held that a sexual har-
assment victim's claim for mental anguish damages under tort law will
generally place her mental condition in controversy,217 a defendant
may argue that a court needs to do little balancing of the parties' in-
terests before granting a motion to compel an examination of a sexual
harassment plaintiff seeking statutory compensation for mental
215 Cf. Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 409 (Cal. 1987) ("[B]y asserting a
causal link between her mental distress and defendants' conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims
it was not caused by a preexisting mental condition, thereby raising the question of alterna-
tive sources for the distress.").
216 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 57247 (daily ed. June 6, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Dole)
(claiming that the 1991 Act transforms Tite VII into a national tort law).
217 See supra note 173.
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anguish. Some state courts require that plaintiffs alleging the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress support their claims with
medical testimony,218 a practice that supports the notion that any
claim seeking tort-like compensation for mental anguish puts the
claimant's mental condition in controversy.
The 1991 Act, however, did not privatize Title VII. Despite its
new tort-like provisions, Title VII remains a civil rights scheme. A pri-
mary aim of the 1991 Act's compensation scheme is to foster enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination law by empowering victims and
encouraging them to act as "private attorneys general" to eradicate
workplace discrimination.2 19 The compensation provisions thus do
not exist solely to provide private remedies for private harms, but also
to spur private action for the public good.
As a consequence, discovery and evidentiary doctrines which may
apply to common law actions should not necessarily apply to actions
brought under Title VII. 220 Courts and the public have increasingly
recognized that discriminatory harassment invariably causes some
level of mental anguish.2 21 Consequently, in actions brought under
other state and federal antidiscrimination statutes, "an aggrieved indi-
vidual need not produce the quantum and quality of evidence to
prove compensatory damages [slhe would have had to produce"
under tort law.2 22 Courts have specifically held that a plaintiff need
218 See Kazantsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. 1987)
("Given the advanced state of medical science, it is unwise and unnecessary to permit re-
covery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant's 'outrageousness' with-
out expert medical confirmation that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress.").
Other states, however, do not require medical testimony to support emotional distress
claims. See, e.g., Latremore v. Latremore, 584 A.2d 626, 632-83 (Me. 1990); Mostenbocker
v. Potts, 863 S.W.2d 126, 184-36 (Tex. 1993).
219 H.R. REP. No. 40(i), supra note 11, at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 603.
220 Cheryl Zemelman notes that courts have "privatized" Title VII, allowing common
law doctrines to limit the availability of antidiscrimination remedies and thus inappropri-
ately restricting the reformatory power of Title VII. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The
After-Acquired EvidenceDefense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. Ray. 175, passim (1993). Zemelman spe-
cifically notes that courts have, since the late 1970s, abandoned a "public policy" model of
Title VII and focused on principles of contract and tort law to develop the increasingly
preclusive after-acquired evidence defense to discrimination claims. See id. at 197-202. At
least in this context, however, the Supreme Court has unanimously repudiated the priva-
tization of antidiscrimination law. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115
S. Ct. 879 (1995) (rejecting the after-acquired evidence defense as a bar to recovery in
employment discrimination actions).
221 Cf Larry Heinrich, The Mental Anguish and Humiliation Suffered by Victims of Housing
Discrimination, 26 J. MARSHALL L. Rv. 39, 43-44 (1992) (discussing findings by the Ken-
tucky Commission on Human Rights which led to the conclusion that "there is a legitimate
presumption of embarrassment and humiliation in all instances of discrimination" which
supports "a basic monetary standard for compensation" where plaintiffs prove discrimina-
tion) (citing KrNTucKY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DAMAcS FOR EMBARRASSMENT AND Hu-
MILIATION IN DISCRIMINATION CASES (1980)).
222 Thorenson v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
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not present expert testimony to support a damages award for emo-
tional distress under antidiscrimination or other civil rights laws, even
where such testimony would be required in a tort action.22 3 Some
courts have held that a finding of statutory discrimination alone "per-
mits the inference of emotional distress as a normal adjunct of the
[defendant's] actions."224
(holding that a sexual harassment plaintiff seeking compensation for emotional distress
under New York antidiscrimination law need not present medical testimony to prove her
claim). See also Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination,
358 N.E.2d 235, 243 n.11 (Mass. 1976) (noting that "[t]he standards applicable to an
award of damages for emotional distress, pain, and suffering under [state civil rights law]
are, for obvious reasons of statutory construction and policy, not as stringent as those appli-
cable to actions of tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress"); Chomicki v. Witte-
kind, 381 N.W.2d 561, 566-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding mental anguish award
under state civil rights law even though evidence offered by plaintiff would not have satis-
fied common-law injury requirement).
223 For example, the court in Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 33
(3d Cir. 1994), upheld a $250,001 award for emotional distress to a plaintiff suing under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) based upon the narrative testimony of the plaintiff, members of his
family, and two of his friends. The Third Circuit affirmed that a civil rights plaintiff need
not present medical testimony to support a claim of emotional distress, even though Penn-
sylvania state law requires medical testimony in intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases. Id. at 34 & n.3 (noting that "[a]ll of the courts of appeals that have expressly consid-
ered this issue have [so] held," and that this approach "is more consistent with the broad
remunerative purpose of the civil rights law"); see also Miner v. City of Glen Falls, 999 F.2d
655, 663 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding damage award for emotional distress based on testi-
mony of plaintiff and his wife, and noting that "there was no reason to expect that
medicines or counseling would dispel the trauma" suffered by the plaintiff); Johnson v.
Hale, 940 F.2d 1192, 1193 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Compensatory damages may be awarded
[under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)] for humiliation and emotional distress established by
testimony or inferred from the circumstances. No evidence of economic loss or medical
evidence of mental or physical symptoms stemming the humiliation need be submitted.")
(citation omitted); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989)
(affirming that sexual harassment plaintiff's testimony about her anguish, coupled with
corroborating testimony of co-workers, supported award for pain and suffering); Carter v.
Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that racial harass-
ment plaintiff was entitled to damages for emotional harm and humiliation based solely on
her testimony); Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn. App.
1991). Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978) ("Although essentially subjective,
genuine injury [of emotional distress in civil rights action] may be evidenced by one's
conduct and observed by others.").
224 Bournewood Hospital, 358 N.E.2d at 243. See also Bolden, 21 F.3d at 33 (noting that "a
jury could have inferred emotional distress from the [circumstances of plaintiff's loss]");
United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The more inherently de-
grading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a
person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action .... ."); Johnson, 940 F.2d at
1193 (holding that compensable "humiliation and emotional distress may be established
by testimony or inferred from the circumstances"); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797
F.2d. 1417, 1425 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (upholding damage award supported primar-
ily by reference to the "very ugly and wounding" racial harassment aimed at the plaintiff, as
well as "the usual and inevitably self-serving testimony of [plaintiff] and his wife"); Buckley
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination, 478 N.E.2d 1292,
1298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (citing the "deep hurt usually felt by the victim of discrimina-
tion" as support for an inference of emotional distress in employment discrimination ac-
tions); Ezra E. H. Griffith & Elwin J. Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury, and Compensatory
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The 1991 Civil Rights Act recognizes that sexual harassment, like
other forms of discrimination, is an inherently injurious act.225 Courts
should recognize that a sexual harassment plaintiff's claims of humili-
ation, distress, anguish, and the like under the 1991 Act are claims of
discrimination-induced injury that do not necessarily place the plain-
tiffs mental condition in controversy. The compensable degree of
such injury can, in many cases, be inferred from the circumstances of
the harassment and bolstered by lay testimony from the plaintiff and
others that the harassment caused her to feel a commensurate level of
humiliation, embarrassment, distress, and anguish. In short, the
plaintiff may prove "actual injury or loss" by focusing attention on the
harassing behavior and testifying that her reaction was a "normal ad-
junct" of that behavior.226 She is thus much like the plaintiff in Coates
v. Whittington:227 she only seeks mental anguish damages commensu-
rate with her other "injury."228 In this case, the other "injury" is the
hostile work environment which she was forced to endure. Such a
Damage, 37 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 71, 73, 75 (asserting that, in discrimination cases,
"in reality it is often the outrageousness of the [defendant's behavior] that leads to the
determination of the plaintiff's injury," and that psychiatric testimony is consequently less
valued in discrimination actions than in tort actions). For an argument that courts should
infer some degree of emotional distress when plaintiffs successfully prove employment dis-
crimination, and thus curtail discovery of plaintiffs' mental health histories, see David A.
Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintifs Mental Health History in an Employment Discrimination
Case, 16 W. NEw ENG. L. Rrmv. 55, 65-67 (1994).
225 See H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 11, at 64-65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at
602-03 ("Monetarty [sic] damages... are necessary to make discrimination victims whole
for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to their
self-respect and dignity.").
226 At least one court has not been receptive to this argument. See Smedley v. Capps,
Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson, 820 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (compelling
psychological examination even though plaintiff dropped tort claims, maintained that she
would not present expert testimony or seek damages for medical expenses, and stated that
she would only present evidence of "normal" emotional distress). The author is aware that
many plaintiffs, in the interest of maximizing damages, claim that they suffer Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD), see DSM IV, supra note 6, at 247, or some other form of
psychiatric injury, and that such claims most likely put their mental condition in contro-
versy. See Haney, supra note 31, at 1052 (stating that "[t]he potential recovery [under the
1991 Act] will cause, if not necessitate, the plaintiff's use of expert testimony in virtually
every case"). While many victims of sexual harassment are severely traumatized, and in-
creased recognition and invocation of such conditions as PTSD can serve to validate their
experiences, the perceived need to pin psychiatric labels on victims in order to legitimize
their claims is troubling and ultimately debilitating. See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket:
Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labelling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271 (1994) (argu-
ing that admission of expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome in criminal sexual
assault cases, though lauded as a significant reform by some feminists, ultimately delegi-
timizes women's reactions to rape). Victims' narratives regarding the circumstances of har-
assment should carry considerable weight in the damages phase as well as the liability
phase of a sexual harassment action; the damages inquiry should not be summarily trans-
formed into a battle over which psychiatric label best applies to the plaintiff.
227 758 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1988).
228 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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claim places the injurious environment-not the plaintiffs mental
condition-in controversy.2 29 Even in the damages phase of a Title
VII sexual harassment action, the focus should remain, to some ex-
tent, on the harassment rather than on the victim.
2. Expertise and Intangibility: The Difficulty of Psychiatric and
Psychological Assessment of Emotional Distress Claims
The court should also carefully consider the extent to which a
mental examination will aid the trier of fact. While forensic psychiatry
and psychology are omnipresent in the legal arena and suitable for
many purposes, they are not precise diagnostic tools. This is especially
true in emotional distress actions, which focus on common reactions
and emotions that are not classified as mental illness and are thus
within the capacity of the jury to assess. Furthermore, emotional dis-
tress and pain are intangible and hence difficult for experts or anyone
else to quantify. Thus, in many cases where plaintiffs allege that sex-
ual harassment caused emotional distress or similar injuries, mental
examinations are unlikely to offer the factfinder much assistance on
matters of causation or damages.
It is axiomatic that in nearly every case where injury is alleged,
experts retained by the opposing parties will disagree as to the nature,
cause, and extent of the injury.23 0 However, in physical injury cases,
medical experts will at least base their conclusions upon scientifically
valid diagnostic processes, and their range of available conclusions
will be limited by objectively determinable factors. Psychiatric diagno-
sis and psychological evaluation are fundamentally more subjective
and imprecise, and admittedly less "scientific," than other forms of
medical diagnosis.23 ' Studies have shown that mental health clini-
229 See Robinson, supra note 224, at 67 ("[I]t is not accurate to say that a plaintiff in an
employment discrimination case has 'introduced' her mental 'condition' into the litigation
by alleging emotional distress. It is more accurate to say that the defendant introduced it
by discriminating against the plaintiff.").
230 This practice has long caused consternation among members of the judiciary:
Under present procedure, where the medical testimony comes from
no objective or necessarily qualified source, and only through the hirelings
of the parties, partisan experts, medical mouthpieces, the jury is more apt
to be confused than enlightened by what it hears. It hears black from one
expert, white from the other, a maximizing or minimizing of injuries in
accordance with the interest of the source of payment for the testimony.
Hon. David W. Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1958).
231 Commentators from both the scientific and legal communities harshly criticize no-
tions that psychiatrists and psychologists can offer scientifically supported and accurate
diagnoses. See, e.g., LEE COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR: PsycmATR', AuTHOmrry, AN LAw
20 (1984) ("Psychiatric labeling, or diagnosis, will always be more uncertain than diagnosis
in medicine.... [It] is not the truly scientific process that occurs in medicine.. .. ");
David Faust &Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, Sc _CcE,July 1, 1988,
at 31-32 (summarizing studies that call into question the validity and reliability of clinical
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cians will often disagree about diagnoses,232 and that when they do
agree, they are often wrong.23 3 Specifically, clinicians tend to find pa-
thology where none exists, or to overestimate the extent of pathol-
ogy.23 4 This imprecision does not render the mental health "sciences"
invalid for most purposes. Clinicians are trained to focus on their pa-
tients' subjective reality, and such a focus is invaluable for providing
therapy; in this context, findings of pathology operate as guides to
treatment, rather than as objectively "true" assessments.23 5 To provide
aid to a factfinder, however, diagnoses must offer reliable insight into
the objective truth. At this stage in their development, except in cases
of fairly severe pathology, it is questionable whether the mental health
sciences can provide such reliable insight
and forensic judgment). For a thorough attack on the scientific validity of psychiatry and
psychology, see 1 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 214, at 82-156.
232 See 1 ZIsIUN & FAUST, supra note 214, at 199-201.
233 The most famous study can be found in David L Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane
Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973). In the study, eight sane "pseudo patients" sought admis-
sion to psychiatric hospitals, claiming that they heard voices which said "empty," "hollow,"
and "thud." They claimed no other symptoms, and upon admission to the psychiatric
wards did not simulate any symptoms ofabnormaity. In patient interviews, they recounted
significant events of their lives as those events actually occurred; besides alleging hearing
voices, they did not lie. All patients were diagnosed schizophrenic (except one, who was
found manic depressive). Each was kept in the hospital for an average of 19 days. Signifi-
candy, a large number of patients at the hospitals at least suspected that the pseudo-pa-
tients were sane, while none of the hospital staff held such suspicions. For a critique of the
Rosenhan study, see Robert L. Spitzer, On Pseudoscience in Science, Logic in Remission, and
Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Critique of Rosenhan's "On Being Sane in Insane Places", 84J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 442 (1975).
234 See l ZIsKIN & FAUST, supra note 214, at 372-80 (summarizing literature which docu-
ments clinicians' tendency to overdiagnose abnormality). While most criticism of the
proliferation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in civil litigation focuses on plain-
tiffs' use of such testimony to inflate damage awards, the tendency to routinely find pathol-
ogy seems to infect both plaintiffs' and defendants' experts in sexual harassment actions.
Typically, plaintiffs' experts find that victims suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or
major depression caused solely by sexual harassment; defendants' experts tend to find that
victims suffer from personality or adjustment disorders that caused them to provoke or
misperceive interpersonal workplace problems. See Barbara L. Long, Psychiatric Diagnoses in
SexualHarassment Cases, 22 Buu. AM. ACAD. PSYCHtATRY& & L. 195, 197 (1994) (summarizing
diagnoses of 44 sexual harassment plaintiffs). Psychiatrist Margaret Jensvold asserts that
clinicians have particularly tended to overdiagnose pathology in women or evaluate wo-
men "in sexually stereotyped and stigmatizing ways" while failing to take their legitimate
claims of abuse seriously. Jensvold, supra note 14, at 443.
235 Many critics of psychology and psychiatry's expansive role in the legal system em-
phasize that assessment and diagnosis are valid insofar as they aid the clinician in establish-
ing a therapy program for a patient. These critics merely object to perceptions held by the
public and the legal community that psychiatrists and psychologists can provide objectively
"true" evaluations that aid legal factfinders in their mission. See CoLEMAN, supra note 231,
at 20-21 (asserting that psychiatry does not need to be scientifically precise, and that its
shortcomings only become serious when "society invests [psychiatric labels] with a preci-
sion and certainty they do not have and allows them to influence public policy"); Faust &
Ziskin, supra note 231, at 82 (noting that clinicians focus primarily on their patients' sub-
jective reality and are minimally trained to determine objective reality); Jensvold, supra
note 14, at 442 (stating that "psychiatric truth" and "legal truth" are often different).
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It is especially questionable whether mental health clinicians can
offer a factfinder valuable insight in most actions where parties claim
mental and emotional distress. Even serious distress, though compen-
sable in court, is not a mental illness or disorder subject to psychiatric
diagnosis.2 36 Rather, mental distress is a universal human condi-
tion.2 37 The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes emotional dis-
tress as encompassing "all unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright,
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, chagrin, disap-
pointment, worry, and nausea."238 Factfinders are capable of assessing
such universal conditions by drawing upon their own experiences.23 9
Expert testimony would not be needed to help a factfinder gauge the
severity and compensability of the plaintiff's distress; consequently, a
mental examination would not aid the factfinding process.
Significantly, mental health experts have agreed with this assess-
ment of the probative value of mental examinations in sexual harass-
ment cases. In its amicus brief in Vinson v. Superior Court, the
California Psychiatric Association argued that no psychological exami-
nation is necessary when a sexual harassment plaintiff merely alleges
emotional distress and does not seek further psychiatric treatment. 240
The association stated that there is no good cause for an examination
in such a case, and that a jury would not need expert testimony to
appreciate that sexual harassment causes emotional distress.241
Finally, mental examinations of plaintiffs claiming mental
anguish are unlikely to aid the factfinder in calculating monetary
damages. Emotional injuries are inherently intangible.2 42 Conse-
quently, courts have long held that the trier of fact has wide latitude to
determine appropriate compensation for emotional distress, pain,
236 Eric H. Marcus, Human Reactions to Life Events: From Joy to Death, 12 AM. J. FoRENsic
PSYCHIATRY 67, 68 (1991).
237 Eric H. Marcus, Damages for Mental Distress in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 37
FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 351, 352 (1987).
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.j (1965).
239 See Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting
that jury listened to racial harassment victim's account of her humiliation and emotional
harm, then "applied its experience and common sense to evaluate this injury").
240 Brief of Amicus Curiae at 5-15, Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987)
(No. SF 24932), cited in Susan R. Klein, Comment, A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules in
Civil Sexual Harassment Suits with Special Emphasis on California Law, 11 INDUS. RE. L.J. 540,
568 n.145 (1990).
241 Id. at 15-30. Another defense-oriented clinician has noted that "the measurement
of [emotional distress of insufficient intensity to result in a psychiatric diagnosis] cannot be
determined solely by psychiatric/psychological assessment methods. Instead, evidence
from impartial wimesses, employers, co-workers, surveillance, and other sources may have
a much more relevant bearing than possible speculations of psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists." Marcus, supra note 205, at 648.
242 See, e.g., Carter, 727 F.2d at 1238 (recognizing that humiliation, despite its intangi-
bility, is compensable in civil rights action).
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and suffering.243 Mental health professionals are usually unable to
provide much assistance to the factfinder when it attempts to place a
price tag on an intangible loss.
3. Collateral Issues and the Credibility Gap: The Impropriety of
Using Mental Examination to Assess Threshold Matters and
Credibility
Feldman-Schorrig and McDonald advocate the use of extensive
examinations aimed at determining whether plaintiffs are hypersensi-
tive or otherwise prone to exaggerating or misperceiving innocuous
sexual behavior.244 They admit that such exploration aims to "accom-
plish a great deal more" than merely assess damages; 245 indeed, this
inquiry delves into "the very basis of the claim itself."246 In essence,
Feldman-Schorrig and McDonald have already lost this battle.2 47 Har-
ris cemented the doctrine that factfinders must employ an objective
standard to assess alleged harassment.2 48 Inquiry under this standard
is not informed by reference to the mental state of the victim. 2 49
243 See, e.g., Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1989) (noting that dam-
ages for pain and suffering and comparable losses are not subject to arithmetic calcula-
tion); Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("Translating mental
anguish into dollars is necessarily an arbitrary process.").
244 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 11.
245 Id. at 7.
246 Feldman-Schorrig, supra note 207, at 332.
247 Feldman-Schorrig and McDonald do not contend that forensic evaluations are nec-
essary to challenge the issue of liability, as opposed to damages, in all suits where plaintiffs
seek compensation for emotional distress. However, they assert that "special issues" ger-
mane to sexual harassment actions counsel in favor of broad use of adverse examinations.
Id. They focus on the fact that many sexual harassment claims pit only the uncorroborated
testimony of the alleged harasser against that of the alleged victim, see id., and that the
sexual and psychic idiosyncrasies of many victims may lead these women to fabricate claims
or misperceive innocuous sexual behavior, see id. at 343-64 (stating that "[w] omen who file
sexual harassment claims often have a history of childhood sexual abuse," and detailing the
role such abuse may play in causing victims to invite or misperceive alleged abuse); Feld-
man-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 13 (asserting that exploration of "the psy-
chological makeup of women who file such claims" is critical because "extraneous factors"
may lead victims to exaggerate or falsify claims). These arguments are disturbingly similar
to those advanced by Wigmore and others to support the claim that alleged victims of
criminal sexual misconduct should undergo mental evaluation before being allowed to
testify. See supra note 163 and accompanying text The concerns expressed by Feldman-
Schorrig and McDonald, as well as by Wigmore, are valid to some degree-rape and sexual
harassment can be difficult claims to disprove (though it must be remembered that prose-
cutors and plaintiffs must satisfy difficult standards of proof), and the "psychic complexes"
of some claimants may lead to specious charges. As courts and legislatures have increas-
ingly recognized, however, these concerns cannot be allowed to dominate sexual miscon-
duct jurisprudence at the expense of powerful competing concerns.
248 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
249 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
The Supreme Court in Harris noted that psychological harm to the plaintiff is a "relevant
factor" in evaluating a hostile environment claim, but held that "no single factor is re-
quired" to establish liability. 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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Thus, to the extent a defendant seeks a mental examination to
counter threshold issues of Title VII liability-in other words, to help
establish that the plaintiff is "hypersensitive" or is not a "reasonable
person"-courts should deny Rule 35 motions.250
In a closely related point, Feldman-Shorrig and McDonald assert
that a major purpose for the mental examination is to assess the plain-
tiffs credibility.251 Like evaluating the hostility of the work environ-
ment at issue in a given case, assessing credibility is the task of the
factfinder. Consequently, courts have consistently denied motions to
compel parties to submit to mental examinations to ascertain their
credibility.2 2 Moreover, studies indicate that mental health clinicians
are often no more likely than laypersons to determine whether a wit-
ness is telling the truth.2 5 3 A court therefore should not grant a Rule
250 Feldman-Schorrig and McDonald misperceive the role of the objective hostile envi-
ronment standard. The standard exists "to shield employers from having to accommodate
the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The standard accomplishes this by requiring the plaintiff to show
that the harassing conduct would alter the conditions of employment for a hypothetical
reasonable person (or, under Ellison, a reasonable woman), regardless of the conduct's
actual effect on the plaintiff. Thus, if the factfinder concludes that the harassing conduct
would not have had such an effect on a reasonable person, the plaintiff loses even if the
conduct seriously affected her well-being. The plaintiff does not, however, bear the bur-
den of showing that she is a reasonable person. Whether or not the plaintiff is "hypersensi-
tive" is thus not directly at issue in the liability phase of a hostile environment action. See
Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 531 (rejecting defendants' claim that allegedly hypersensitive plain-
tiff placed her mental condition in controversy by alleging that "her psychological well
being, as well as the psychological well being of all reasonable individuals exposed to like
circumstances, is seriously affected by defendants' behavior"). Feldman-Schorrig and Mc-
Donald have no basis for their claim that clinicians should be allowed to explore the
threshold "issue" of whether the plaintiff is "hypersensitive" or "reasonable." See, e.g., Feld-
man-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 12; Feldman-Schorrig, supra note 207, at
336. If their argument were accepted, all plaintiffs seeking to meet an objective standard
of proof would put their mental conditions in controversy, as they would be tacitly claiming
that they are "reasonable" persons.
251 Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 23-26.
252 See, e.g., Tyler v. District Court, 561 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo. 1977) (dismissing claim
that party's mental condition was in controversy because it might bear on his credibility);
Connolly v. Labowitz, No. 830-AU-1, 1985 WL 189306 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 1985);
Landau v. Laughren, 357 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1962); see also United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d
509, 517 (7th Cir.) (noting that the court below was properly leery of psychiatric examina-
tions of witness and psychiatric testimony about witness credibility because "the jury can
observe for itself... the witness's behavior"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988); United
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[T]hejury is the lie detector in the
courtroom."), cert. denied 416 U.S. 959 (1974).
253 See supra note 210; see also Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and
Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. Ray. 331 (1985) (noting that experts cannot provide an accu-
rate version of historical truth because stories inevitably transform during the therapeutic/
diagnostic process).
In a limited area, techniques used by mental health clinicians can to some degree
assess credibility. Certain psychological tests, particularly the MMPI, offer validity scales
that help reveal whether a plaintiff is "malingering," feigning psychological injury, or con-
cealing psychosis. See Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 27 (declaring the
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35 motion for the purpose of assessing the plaintiff's credibility.
4. Privacy, Prejudice, and Potential Mischief. The Plaintiffs
Interests
Courts have long expressed solicitude for the privacy interests of
sexual harassment plaintiffs and have routinely barred discovery254
and admission 255 of evidence relating to plaintiffs' sexual history.
More recently, Congress and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence codified these concerns by extending the federal rape shield
rule to civil actions; the amended Rule 412 sharply constrains admissi-
bility of evidence regarding the sexual behavior and predisposition of
sexual harassment victims.2 56 The drafters explicitly intended this
MMPI "eminently valuable in the detection of classic malingering"); Marcus, supra note
205, at 649. Such tests may arguably be relevant in the damages phase of a Title VII trial.
Numerous studies, however, call into question the ability of psychological assessment meth-
ods to accurately detect malingering. See, e.g., 2 ZisiuN & FAUST, supra note 214, at 850-76.
Moreover, studies indicate that tests may be accurate at detecting malingering of more
severe forms of psychosis, but are less attuned to detecting malingering of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, see Paul R. Lees-Haley, Malingering Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder on the
MMPI, 2 FoRENsIc RFP. 89 (1989) (reporting an erroneous classification rate of 52% to
80%), depression and generalized anxiety disorder, Richard Rogers et al., Feigning Specific
Disorders: A Study of the Personality Assessment Inventory, 60 J. PERSONAITY ASSESSMENT 554
(1993) (finding the negative impression validity scale PAI marginally effective in detecting
feigned depression, and ineffective in detecting malingering of generalized anxiety disor-
der), and emotional distress, Paul R. Lees-Haey, MMPI-2 F and F-K Scores of Personal Injury
Malingers in Vocational Neuropsychological and Emotional Distress Claims, 9 J. FoaxNsic PSYCHoL-
oG, 5 (1991) (suggesting that lower cutoff scores should be used for personal injury malin-
gerers than for criminal defendants feigning insanity or incompetence). At least one
court, questioning the reliability and validity of personality testing, refused to compel a
sexual harassment plaintiff to submit to a battery of tests which included the MMPI-2. See
Usher v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 412-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
254 See, e.g., Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414, 418 (M.D. Ala. 1992)
(noting that "courts need to be particularly vigilant in controlling discovery in sexual har-
assment cases," and barring discovery of plaintiff's prior sexual activity); Priest v. Rotary, 98
F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 410-11 (Cal. 1987).
255 See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing evidence that plaintiff posed nude in magazine irrelevant to issue of unwelcomeness of
workplace advances); Sutton v. Overcash, 623 N.E.2d 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding evi-
dence of plaintiff's affair with a married man irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to sexual
harassment plaintiff).
256 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918-19 (amending FED. R. EvID. 412). The relevant portion of
the new Rule, which went into effect on December 1, 1994, reads as follows:
(a) EVIDENCE GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE.-The following evidence is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct...
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or
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Rule to significantly curtail discovery of a victim's sexual history.25 7
This protection, according to the drafters, is designed "to encourage
victims to come forward" with civil actions by eliminating the threat of
intimidating, invasive, and embarrassing discovery and disclosure of
intimate details.2 58 Consequently, in most cases, courts will likely limit
the scope of a compelled examination to prohibit the sweeping explo-
ration of the plaintiff's sexual history urged by defense-oriented clini-
cians.25 9  Implementing such protections, however, can prove
difficult. While Rule 412 may serve to prevent discovery of sexual his-
tory, it will not prevent broad inquiry into other aspects of a plaintiffs
psychological history. Sexuality inevitably bleeds into many nooks of
most people's lives (especially according to Freudian psychiatrists260).
Thus, it would not be difficult for the examiner to stray, during the
course of an "open ended... spontaneous" examination, 261 beyond
the permitted scope of the examination into sexual matters.2 62 Such
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is other-
wise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only
if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
FED. Kt Evm. 412 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court initially declined to adopt the proposed amendment extending
Rule 412 to civil actions, noting that evidence of an alleged victim's sexual behavior may be
relevant under Meritois broad "unwelcomeness" standard, see supra note 84, and that the
proposed amendment might thus "encroach on the rights of defendants." AN AMENDMENT
TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.it Doc. No. 250, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. iii, v
(1994), reprinted in 154 F.R.D. 508, 509-10 (1994).
257 While evidence rules do not apply to discovery, the Advisory Committee noted that:
In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412... courts should
enter appropriate orders ... to protect the victim against unwarranted in-
quiries .... Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring
discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evi-
dence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theo-
ries of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through
discovery. In an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while some evi-
dence of the alleged victim's sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the
work place may perhaps be relevant, non-work place conduct will usually be
irrelevant.
FED. Rt EID. 412 advisory committee's note, reported at 154 F.1.D. 513, 533-4 (1994). This
presumption against discovery of sexual behavior extends to "behavior of the mind"; thus,
an examiner could not attempt to discover a complainant's sexual fantasies or dreams. Id.,
154 F.R.D. at 528.
258 Id., 154 F.R.D. at 529.
259 See supra note 212 and accompanying text; see also Feldman-Schorrig, supra note
207, at 342 (asserting that "[a] sexual harassment claimant's sexual history (including, in
particular, any history of incest, sexual abuse, or rape) is indispensable to an accurate
understanding of a variety of clinical and legal issues in the case").
260 Freudian theorists postulate that innate biological drives, especially the sexual
drive, are primary determinants of human behavior. PFTrR SHEA, PSYCHIATRY IN COURT 19
(1993).
261 See Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note 208, at 26.
262 See Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (noting that
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invasions-whether innocent or invidious-would go undetected be-
cause prevailing federal practice does not allow the plaintiff to have
counsel, an observer, or a recording device at the examination.263
This invasiveness may not only be embarrassing and offensive-it
can also lead to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Ac-
cording to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, expert witnesses may testify
regarding any facts which they would normally deem relevant in
reaching their expert opinion, even if those facts would not otherwise
be admissible. 26 4 Should an examiner extract information regarding
the victim's sexual history, the examiner could reveal that information
at trial under Rule 703.265 Moreover, examiners may circumvent lim-
its on hearsay evidence by asking the examinee questions containing
hearsay, then repeating the question and the answer to it at trial.266
Thus, the examination offers opportunities for abuse by allowing the
defendant to slip embarrassing or damaging evidence before the trier
of fact.
C. Outcome of the Balancing Test
A compelled mental examination offers limited aid to the
factfinder; conversely, it is potentially invasive, easily abused, and diffi-
cult for either the court or the plaintiffs attorney to monitor. Conse-
quently, the balancing test should favor the Title VII plaintiff in many
cases. This balance shifts somewhat, however, if the plaintiff plans to
be examined by and offer the testimony of a friendly expert,26 7 or if
she claims damage or distress beyond that which would normally stem
from the alleged harassing conduct.
Even in cases that warrant a mental examination, a court should
view the motion skeptically, scrutinizing the defendant's alleged mo-
tives and proposed methods. Recent opinions by SeniorJudge Milton
I. Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois illustrate such an ap-
"[t]here are numerous advantages, unrelated to the emotional damage issue, which the
defendants might unfairly derive from an unsupervised examination"), ajfd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
263 See infra part IV.B.
264 See FED. R. EvID. 703.
265 See Richard G. Moon & Julie Boesky, Discovey Problems and Solutions in Sex Harass-
ment Cases, in SEXuAL HARASSMENT LrIGATION 1993, supra note 12, at 63, 93 (observing
that, through Rule 703, "it may be possible to use all kinds of embarrassing information ...
which arguably is irrelevant").
266 Wayne Outten andJack Raisner offer the following example: "Isn't it true that you
overheard someone say that your supervisor boasted to others that he thought you were
'coming on' to him by the way you always puckered your lips at him?" Outten & Raisner,
supra note 12, at 266.
267 But see Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deny-
ing motion to compel mental examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs even though
plaintiffs planned to have their therapists testify to support claims for compensatory dam-
ages under state antidiscrimination law).
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proach. In Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, Judge Shadur granted
the defendant's motion to examine a sexual harassment plaintiff who
sought damages for continuing emotional distress.2 68 However, con-
cerned about the "particularly sensitive" nature of mental examina-
tions,26 9 the judge ordered that an independent examiner conduct
the evaluation.270 In doing so, the judge expressed thinly veiled skep-
ticism of the defendant's motives:
If the real purpose of [defendant's] motion is... to obtain an in-
dependent and impartial insight into [plaintiff's] claims of mental
harm, that purpose would seem to be better served by assuring true
independence on the part of the examiner, rather than by forcing
[plaintiff] into a battle of the experts that she has not sought to join
(let alone to initiate).271
Similarly, in Usher v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., Judge
Shadur viewed the defendant's proposed methods with skepticism, al-
lowing a clinical evaluation of the plaintiff but denying defendant's
proposed battery of psychological tests.272
In both cases,Judge Shadur exercised his discretion to "provid[e]
a level playing field for the parties."273 Denial or modification of a
proposed adverse mental examination hardly tilts the playing field
against a defendant. Just as a sexual harassment victim may establish
the cause and extent of her emotional distress through her own testi-
mony and that of corroborating witnesses, the defense may seek out
discovery and testimony from witnesses familiar with the plaintiff and
her workplace. These witnesses could rebut plaintiff's charges regard-
ing the hostility of the work environment and the cause and extent of
her mental anguish. These witnesses could also testify regarding the
plaintiff's credibility. Similarly, denial of a mental examination would
not bar the defendant from using other discovery devices against the
plaintiff. Through interrogatories, requests for document produc-
tion, and depositions, the defendant may probe inconsistencies in the




Just as mental examinations should not be granted as a matter of
268 158 F.R.D. 409, 410 (N.D. IM. 1994). See also discussion supra note 30.
269 158 F.R.D. at 410.
270 Id. at 411.
271 Id.
272 158 F.R.D. 411, 412-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994). See discussion supra notes 152-54 and ac-
companying text.
273 Usher, 158 F.R.D. at 414; see also Jansen, 158 F.R.D. at 411 (discussing need for "a
level playing field" as a factor in Rule 35 determinations).
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right, they should not be denied as a matter of right. Decisions re-
garding the appropriateness of compelled mental examinations of
sexual harassment plaintiffs are best left to the discretion of the
courts, provided that they strike the appropriate balance among all
interests involved. Thus far, this Note has advocated no black letter
rules, but rather has presented factors recognized by existing law and
policy which should guide courts as they consider motions to compel
mental examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs. Certain proce-
dural reforms, however, can help to establish basic parameters for a
court's exercise of discretion. This Part will briefly address several
measures designed to prevent and deter invidious use of mental exam-
inations and to provide an avenue for review of examination orders.
A. Discovery Shield Rules
By adopting amendments that extend application of the federal
rape shield law to civil actions, Congress has provided courts with a
valuable tool for curtailing abuse of Rule 35 examinations of sexual
harassment plaintiffs.274 Because it is an evidence rule, however,
amended Rule 412 is ill-suited to the task of fully eradicating unduly
invasive discovery. In letter and spirit, discovery rules are far more
liberal than evidence rules, allowing parties license to seek informa-
tion that may not be admissible at trial.2 75 Some courts will be in-
clined to permit discovery of evidence that may ultimately prove
inadmissible under Rule 412.276 For potential plaintiffs, wary of the
specter of an intrusive examination, this prospect may be enough to
deter many from bringing suit. Thus, though now designed to en-
courage sexual harassment victims to come forward,277 Rule 412 may
take hold too late in the litigation process to serve this objective.
Consequently, Rule 412 should be supplemented with amend-
274 See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text. The federal evidentiary shield is not
the first in the country to constrain sexual history evidence in civil actions-California
enacted evidentiary shields for sexual harassment complainants in the 1980s. CAL EVID.
CODE § 1106 (West Supp. 1995) & CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11513 (West Supp. 1995) bar opin-
ion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific sexual conduct to prove con-
sent by the plaintiff or lack of injury to the plaintiff, unless the sexual conduct was with the
alleged harasser.
275 See FED. 1- Cry. P. 26(b) (1) (stating that "[t]he information sought [through dis-
covery] need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"). While Rule 35 is more restric-
tive on its face than other discovery rules, courts have still noted that, "[a]s a pretrial dis-
covery rule .... Rule 35(a) should be interpreted liberally in favor of granting discovery."
In re Certain Asbestos Cases, 112 F.R.D. 427, 432 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (ordering autopsy of
decedent).
276 Cf. Hodges v. Keane, 145 F.LD. 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting psychiatric
examination of plaintiff with demonstrated psychosis, but cautioning that the fruits of the
examination may be sufficiently confusing or prejudicial to bar admission at trial).
277 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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ments to discovery rules that set high thresholds for discovery of har-
assment plaintiffs' sexual history. California2 78 and Iowa279 have
enacted such rules. In tandem with evidentiary shields, discovery
shields would ensure that sexual harassment suits do not become inva-
sive and embarrassing forays into the plaintiffs' psyches and sexual
histories, and that plaintiffs do not find their virtue on trial when they
simply attempt to "secure their statutory right to be free from sexual
denigration." 28 0
B. Presence of Counsel, Observer, or Recording Devices
Rule 35 is silent as to whether a court may order that an adverse
examination be observed by the examinee's counsel or a third party.
Generally, federal courts faced with the issue have ruled that parties
have no right to have counsel present during an examination.28
These courts have reasoned that the examination should not take on
the flavor of an adversarial procedure: "The very presence of a lawyer
for one side will inject a partisan note into what should be a wholly
278 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 2017(d) (West Supp. 1995) states in part that:
In any civil action... alleging conduct that constitutes sexual harassment,
sexual assault, or sexual battery, any party seeking discovery concerning the
plaintiff's sexual conduct with individuals other than the alleged perpetra-
tor is required to establish specific facts showing good cause for that discov-
ery, and that the matter sought to be discovered is relevant to the subject
matter of the action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
This rule has effectively constrained defendants' attempts to delve into plaintiffs' ar-
guably relevant sexual histories and attitudes. In Knoettgen v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), a California appeals court denied discovery concerning
sexual assaults that plaintiff suffered as a child even though the defendant's forensic psy-
chiatrist believed that those incidents affected the plaintiff's current perceptions of sexual-
ity. In Mendez v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 731, 739-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), the court
denied discovery of a tort complainant's sexual activities with co-workers and others
outside of work, even though such activities may have been relevant to the cause of her
alleged distress.
279 IowA CODE § 668.15 (Supp. 1994). While the language of the Iowa rule tracks that
of the California rule, see supra note 278, it has been more narrowly interpreted. SeeWeiss
v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 314 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (holding that § 668.15 did not bar
defendant from deposing plaintiff about her sexual conduct with other employees about
which the defendant knew).
280 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
281 See, e.g., Tirado v. Erosa, 158 F.R.D. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Wheat v. Biesecker, 125
F.RD. 479 (N.D. Ind. 1989); Neumeriski v. Califano, 518 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Brandenberg v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (disallowing pres-
ence of counsel at psychiatric examination of sexual harassment victim); see also Galied v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 262, 265 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that in
appropriate cases, observers may be allowed to attend the examination if the party seeking
the protective order convinces the court that allowing an observer is necessary). Cf. Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470 n.14 (1980) (reserving decision on whether the Sixth Amend-
ment accords a criminal defendant the right to have counsel present during a forensic
psychiatric examination, but noting that an attorney's presence "could contribute little and
might seriously disrupt the examination") (citation omitted).
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objective inquiry."28 2 If allowed into the examination, lawyers would
to some degree assume control over it. They would thus usurp the
doctor's role as an objective seeker of truth.283
Not all federal courts have accepted this reasoning. In Zabkowicz
v. West Bend Co.,284 the District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin ruled that a sexual harassment plaintiff may have a third party,
including her lawyer, attend a compelled psychiatric examination.28 5
The court noted that a forensic examination is essentially an adver-
sarial proceeding.28 6 Consequently, the plaintiffs interest in protec-
tion from unsupervised adversarial interrogation outweighed the
defendant's interest in unfettered discovery.2 87 More recently, in Vree-
land v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,2 8 8 the District Court for the Southern District
of New York permitted plaintiffs' attorney in an employment discrimi-
nation action to attend psychological examinations, reasoning that
"the presence of the attorney is more likely to produce a higher qual-
ity ofjustice and fairness in the ensuing trial. "2 89 In addition, numer-
ous state courts have held that an examinee may have her attorney
present unless the examining party can show good cause to exclude
counsel.2 90 Finally, some states' procedural rules dictate that parties
have a right to have counsel present at adverse examinations.2 91
Courts that have allowed attorneys to attend examinations reject
the notion that an adverse forensic evaluation is not an adversarial
event. The defendant's expert is not a neutral officer of the court
sought for his expertise, but a hired gun.2 92 A mental examination,
282 Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595, 597 (D. Md. 1960).
283 See, e.g., Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427, 428 (D. Del. 1969). Cf Robert Lloyd
Goldstein, Consequences of Surveillance ofthe Forensic Psychiatric Examination: An Overview, 145
Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 1243, 1244-46 (1988) (surveying studies which indicate that surveillance
of an examination causes anxiety for the examiner).
284 585 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 789
F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
285 Id. at 636.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 151 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
289 Id. at 551.
290 See, e.g., Langfeldt-Haaland v. Saupe Enters., 768 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1989);
Bartell v. McCarrick, 498 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Reardon v. Port
Auth., 503 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Tiejen v. Department of Labor & In-
dus., 534 P.2d 151, 153-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975); see also Nomina v. Eggeman, 188 N.E.2d
440 (Ohio 1962) (allowing attorney to attend examination if party can show good cause).
But see Hayes v. District Court, 854 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Colo. 1993) (finding no presumptive
right to the presence of counsel);Jacob v. Chaplin, 630 N.E.2d 1010 (Ind. 1994) (same);
State ex reL Hess v. Henry, 393 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1990) (same).
291 See, e.g., 735 ILCS § 5/2-1003(d) (1993) ("[T]he plaintiff has the right to have his
or her attorney, or such other person as the plaintiff may wish, present at such physical or
mental examination."). Other states' rules permit a plaintiff's "representative" to attend an
examination. See Amiz. R. Crv. P. 35(a); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3235(d) (1994).
292 SeeJukabowski v. Lengen, 450 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("A physi-
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then, can often amount to a "de facto deposition."293 Allowing such a
proceeding without the presence of counsel poses substantial dangers
to plaintiffs, as the unchecked examiner could extract, and potentially
introduce as evidence, information outside the permissible scope of
the examination.2 94 Consequently, Rule 35 should be amended to al-
low the examinee's counsel to attend the examination if the examin-
ing party cannot show good cause to bar counsel. Courts should
maintain discretion to confine counsel to a passive role, permitting
interruption of the examination only for demonstrable good cause.2 95
In the alternative, Rule 35 could be amended to allow a less con-
troversial form of monitoring. Some courts that have not allowed
counsel to attend examinations have allowed the examinee to bring
her own doctor or other third party to observe the examination.2 98
Other courts have allowed parties to tape record the examination.2 97
Such a provision is written into some states' discovery rules. 298 While
these compromise solutions may not fully protect the examinee from
unduly invasive inquiry, they would allow the parties and the court to
monitor the examination unobtrusively.
C. Expanded Availability of Interlocutory Appeal
Currently, a party who objects to an order compelling an adverse
medical examination faces a difficult choice: either submit to the ex-
cian selected by defendant to examine plaintiff is not necessarily a disinterested, impartial
medical expert, indifferent to the conflicting interests of the parties."); see also John F.
Fielder, Sexual Harassment Backlash, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1993, at B4 (reporting that a
worker's compensation attorney said, "We pay the doctors (psychologists and psychiatrists)
to say whatever we want them to say.").
293 Zabkowicz, 585 F. Supp. at 636. See also Langfelt-Haaland, 768 P.2d at 1145 (summa-
rizing courts' reasoning that counsel can prevent examination from transforming into a
'sort of deposition"); Shannon P. Duffy, Psychiatrist Cross-Examined by Plaintiffs, LEGAL INTEL-
UGENCER, Aug. 3, 1993, at 8 (reporting attorney's assertion that psychiatric examination of
sexual harassment plaintiff "turned into something more like a cross examination than a
psychological evaluation").
294 See supra part I1.B.4.
295 See, e.g., Vreeland, 151 F.R.D. at 551 (requiring the attorney to "behave in an orderly
fashion and not meddle or attempt in any way to direct or control the examination").
296 See, e.g., DiBari v. Incaica Cia Armadora, 126 F.R.D. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (allowing
presence of an independent court reporter); Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 101 F.R.D.
296 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing sexual harassment plaintiff to have her own medical expert
in the examination room during psychiatric examination); Rochen v. Huang, 558 A.2d
1108, 1110-11 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (barring counsel but permitting sex abuse plaintiff to
be accompanied by a health care professional of their choice); Gray v. Victory Memorial
Hosp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (allowing plaintiff to be accompanied by own
psychiatrist).
297 See, e.g.,Jacob v. Chaplin, 639 N.E.2d 1010 (Ind. 1994); Vinson v. Superior Court,
740 P.2d 404, 413 (Cal. 1987).
298 Amiz. R. Crv. P. 35(a) (allowing audiotape recording as a matter of right and per-
mitting videotape recording upon a showing of good cause); CAl- CV. PROC. CODE
§ 2032(g) (2) (West 1993).
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amination or risk potentially severe sanctions. 299 Because it is not a
final judgment,300 a discovery order generally is not subject to inter-
locutory review.301 On rare occasions, parties have successfully in-
voked exceptions to the final judgment rule and obtained
interlocutory appeal of discovery orders. First, in cases where Rule 35
orders amounted to a clear abuse of discretion, courts of appeal have
issued writs of mandamus.30 2 Second, courts have occasionally in-
voked the judicially-created collateral order doctrine303 to review Rule
35 orders.304 Finally, district courts may certify certain decisions for
299 FED. P. Crw. P. 37(b) (2). The court may prevent a party from introducing evidence
of the condition to have been examined, take as true the opponent's allegations regarding
the condition, strike the pleadings, or dismiss the action. See, e.g., Commercial Nat'l Bank
v. Tapp, 125 F.R.D. 695, 695 (D. Kan. 1989) (striking counterclaims when defendant failed
to submit to Rule 35 examination). The court may also order the offending party to pay
expenses stemming from its failure to comply. FED. R Crv. P. 37(b) (2) (E). The court may
not, however, hold the reluctant party in contempt. Id.
300 The "finaljudgment" rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), reads: "The courts of appeals
.. shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States." A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment." Lauro Lines S.LR. v.
Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 497 (1989) (citation omitted).
301 8 CHARLEs A. WmoIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRAcTcEr Aam PROCEDURE § 2006, at 76
(1994).
302 See Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); In re Mitchell, 563 F.2d 143 (5th
Cir. 1977) (granting writ of mandamus because petition for discovery did not meet height-
ened requirements of Rule 35); Winters v. Travia, 495 F.2d 839, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1974)
(granting writ of mandamus overturning order that compelled a Christian Scientist to sub-
mit to mental and physical examinations).
Generally, however, mandamus is rarely available to review Rule 35 orders. The
Supreme Court has traditionally reserved the writ for exceptional cases involving clear
abuses of discretion. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)
(noting that the writ of mandamus should not be used as a substitute for appeal). The
Schlagenhauf Courtjustified its use of mandamus because the case presented questions of
first impression on the meaning of Rule 35, 379 U.S. at 111, but cautioned that the writ
should not generally be available when courts merely err in applying established doctrine,
id. at 112. Thus, even if a court errs in applying the standards for evaluating Rule 35
motions, mandamus will generally not be available. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d
402, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
303 The doctrine emerged from the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). As stated in Cohen, the doctrine required that
(1) the district court's order conclusively determine a disputed issue; (2) the right asserted
in the order be collateral to and separable from the merits of the underlying action; (3)
the right asserted be in danger of being irreparably lost; and (4) the question presented be
serious and unsettled. Id. at 546-47. Subsequently, the Court modified these requirements
somewhat. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), the Court held that,
to be appealable under the Cohen doctrine, an order must (1) "conclusively determine the
disputed question," (2) "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action," and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
304 In Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1990), the court allowed a
plaintiffs appeal of an order for a compelled examination by a vocational expert. In find-
ing that the requirements for the collateral order doctrine were met, the court cited the
four elements presented in Cohen, id. at 207-08, rather than the more restrictive post-Cohen
requirements. See supra note 303. Consequently, the court did not require that the exami-
nation order be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
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interlocutory appeal;30 5 in theory, Rule 35 orders might be appealable
by this route.30 6 In practice, however, each of these avenues for ob-
This requirement, however, proved the downfall of an employment discrimination
plaintiff's attempt to appeal an order to submit to a compelled mental examination. Reise
v. Board of Regents, 957 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.). The court rejected
Acosta's reasoning, finding that a Rule 35 order is not effectively unreviewable on appeal
from final judgment. Id. at 295. The plaintiff, according to Judge Easterbrook, could al-
ways refuse to comply with the examination order; as a sanction, the trial court would most
likely strike plaintiff's claim for damages. Id. The plaintiff could then, if he prevailed on
the merits, appeal the order striking the damages claim and receive review of the Rule 35
order. Id.
The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have completely rejected the use of the collat-
eral order doctrine to review discovery orders. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, NA v.
Turner & Newell, PLC, 964 F.2d Cir. 159, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1992); Richards v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber, 928 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Ernst & Whitney, 921 F.2d 83, 85 (6th Cir.
1990). Others, however, have sanctioned such use. See, e.g., Acosta, 913 F.2d at 208; In re
Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For a view that the collateral order doc-
trine should be interpreted to allow review of discovery orders, see Nicole E. Paolini, Note,
The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine: The Proper Vehicle for Interlocutory Appeal of Discovery Or-
ders, 64 TUL. L. REv. 215 (1989).
305 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1988). If the trial judge determines that an "order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation," she may certify that order for appeal, which the court of
appeals has discretion to permit. Id. Courts have offered divergent definitions of what
amounts to a "controlling question of law." Some have held that an issue may, in a practi-
cal sense, be controlling if interlocutory appeal would save delay and costs. See, e.g., Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974). Others have rejected this reasoning, noting that a controlling question must be
one that could materially affect the outcome of an action, and that it is not enough that
immediate review may materially advance the litigation. See, e.g., In re Cement Antitrust
Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement
Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983).
Wright and Miller state that "it is difficult to believe that a discovery order will present
a controlling question of law" and consequently that review under § 1292(b) usually
should not be allowed. WmGHT Er AL., supra note 301, § 2006, at 83. Most courts have
adopted this approach. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.14
(3d Cir. 1986) (noting that appeal under § 1292(b) would not be available to review dis-
trict court's modification of protective order).
306 In 1978, two appellate courts granted appeals under § 1292(b) to review orders
that were potentially more invasive and violative of important substantive rights than stan-
dard discovery requests. See Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 904 (4th Cir.
1978) (granting appeal and reversing district court order that improvidently permitted
inspection of defendant's plants); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (reviewing
journalist's claim that order compelling discovery of materials culled in preparation for an
allegedly defamatory broadcast violated the First Amendment), rev'd on the merits, 441 U.S.
153 (1978); see also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.) (reviewing ruling on
scope of attorney-client privilege and its effect on discovery order), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1970). Rule 35 orders, particularly for mental examinations of sexual harassment victims,
are potentially more invasive than other forms of discovery and implicate vital privacy
rights. See supra part II. Consequently, such orders should be reviewable under § 1292(b).
In practice, however, § 1292(b) has never been used to obtain review of a Rule 35
order. SeeJoseph G. Matye, Comment, Interlocutory Appeals of Rule 35 Medical Examination
Orders, 61 UMKC L. REv. 503, 525 n.177 (1993) (basing conclusion on Westlaw search,
updated by this author). The likely reason for this is the prevailing notion that § 1292(b)
applies only to "big" cases. See Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922
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tamining prejudgment review of discovery orders is profoundly
limited.3 07
As discovery has come to dominate litigation,308 members of the
legal community have expressed increasing concern that abuse and
overuse of discovery procedures intrude upon individuals' privacy
rights and impede justice.3 09 Allowing interlocutory appeals of poten-
tially invasive or abusive discovery orders could curb such practices.
Therefore, despite judicial distaste for expansion of appellate jurisdic-
tion,310 commentators have expressed increasing enthusiasm for loos-
ening restrictions on interlocutory appeals.31' Congress has recently
passed legislation allowing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules (1)
to clarify the final order rule3 12 and (2) to define circumstances in
which otherwise unappealable interlocutory orders may be ap-
pealed.3 13 Legislative history suggests that Congress intends these
rules to streamline the interlocutory appeal process and make such
appeals more readily available.3 14 One commentator has recently sug-
gested modifying procedural rules to create a streamlined process for
interlocutory appeals of discovery orders that would violate substantial
(6th Cir. 1966). Rule 35 orders generally arise in "ordinary suits for personal injuries" and
thus are not appropriate subjects for 1292(b) review. Id. For discussion and criticism of
the "big case" requirement, see Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts, 58 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 1165, 1193-95 (1990).
307 See supra notes 302-06.
308 "The journey from complaint to resolution is a slow trek across the badlands of
discovery." Discovery, LrrG., Fall 1988, at 7.
309 Such concerns are not new. Over 15 years ago, the Pound Conference observed
that:
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the discovery pro-
cess is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions. .. seem to be the
norm. Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs
to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a
lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial strategy.
William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System
in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1977).
310 See, e.g., Rehnquist: CutJurisdiction, A.BA J., Apr. 1989, at 22 (reporting the Chief
Justice's concerns about overcrowding of federal appellate dockets).
311 These commentators differ on the proper avenue for reform. See Solimine, supra
note 306, at 1175-83 (arguing for increased use of § 1292(b) appeals); Daniel J. Lawler,
Comment, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in the Federal Courts, 1980 S. ILL. LJ. 339 (advo-
cating greater use of mandamus to review discovery orders); Paolini, supra note 304, 233-34
(suggesting a modified form of the Cohen collateral order doctrine to permit more fre-
quent appeal of discovery orders).
312 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 100-650, 104 Stat. 5115
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 2072(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
313 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.
4506 (codified at § 28 U.S.C. 1292(e) (Supp. V 1993)).
314 See Matye, supra note 306, at 530-31 (discussing the legislative history of the Acts).
Matye also notes that Congress earlier considered legislation that would have permitted
interlocutory appeals that were "essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be ef-
fectively enforced on review after final decision." Id. at 529 (quoting H.R. REP. 3152, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 702(a) (1987)).
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privacy rights or substantially hinder a party's ability to try the
lawsuit 315
Such reform would aid in ensuring adequate protection of the
privacy interests of sexual harassment plaintiffs. It would also protect
defendants' interests where courts deny examinations for which de-
fendants have good cause.3 16 Furthermore, increased use of interloc-
utory appeals would allow appellate courts to clarify the proper scope
and application of Rule 35 in sexual harassment cases. As this Note
has stressed, social attitudes and legal responses to sexual harassment
are rapidly evolving. This evolution, and the powerful policy concerns
fueling it, should affect trial courts' treatment of the discovery and use
of evidence in sexual harassment actions. Allowing these issues to
reach the circuit courts could hasten and deepen the impact of sexual
harassment law reform by solidifying principles to guide district courts
in enlightened exercises of discretion.
CONCLUSION
America's culture and legal system have made fitful progress to-
wards recognizing the effects of workplace discrimination and com-
pensating those who suffer through it. Increasingly, courts have
recognized that a plaintiff who alleges a hostile work environment pri-
marily places her working conditions in controversy. Her claims do
not necessarily place her mental condition in sufficient controversy to
warrant a broad and unsupervised probing of her personal and sexual
history, even when she alleges that the hostile environment caused
her emotional harm. Fairness dictates that defendants be allowed to
vigorously protect themselves from sexual harassment charges. Com-
mitment to social progress, however, demands that courts and legisla-
tures vigorously weed out procedures that reflect outmoded responses
to the claims of sexual misconduct victims and do little to advance the
search for truth. This Note maintains that courts should engage in
315 See Matye, supra note 306, at 532-35.
316 Such a rule could also protect defendants from invasive discovery by plaintiffs.
Rule 35 orders are not limited to plaintiffs. Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-14
(1964). Plaintiffs may claim that they have good cause to explore the attitudes of defend-
ants to determine whether defendants were predisposed to creating a hostile environment.
See Certain ex reL Certain v. Villanova Univ., No. 90-7446, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15358, at
*1-*2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1991) (denying mental examination of racial discrimination de-
fendants); Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (reversing and remanding order denying mental examination of sexual harass-
ment defendant). Plaintiffs may also attempt to discover details of defendants' sexual his-
tory. See, e.g., Boler v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding
alleged harasser's refusal to answer depositions about female employees with whom he had
sexual relations). For a discussion of privacy concerns implicated by plaintiffs' attempts to
discover sexual history information from sexual harassment defendants, see Lawrence J.
Baer et al., Essay, Discovering Sexual Relations-Balancing the Fundamental Right to Privacy
Against the Need for Discovery in a Sexual Harassment Case, 25 NEv ENG. L. Rav. 849 (1992).
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careful, context-sensitive consideration of the costs and benefits of
compelling mental examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs.
Such an approach is not a large step towards legal reform. It is, how-
ever, an appropriate one.
Kent D. Stresemant
t I owe thanks to Linda Hirshman for inspiration, to Janet Durholz, Jessica Berg,
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